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THE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT SITUATION
IN MINNESOTA
B. M. GILE and J. D. BLACK
INTRODUCTION
The 1925 agricultural census, as of January i of that year, re-
ported 48.6 per cent of the full-owner and part-owner operated farms
of Minnesota as having a mortgage encumbrance—a decrease of 3.8
per cent from the 52.4 per cent reported mortgaged in 1920. For the
1920 census, 6.9 per cent of the owner operators did not state whether
their farms were mortgaged, as contrasted with only o.8 per cent
for the 1910 census. Possibly a still larger percentage did not report
on this question in 1925 and a large majority of those not reporting
may have had mortgages on their farms. The mortgages reported
on owner-operated farms in 1925 averaged $5,117, or 43.6 per cent
of the owners' estimated values. On January 1, 1920, the average
mortgage amounted to $4,419, or 27.5 per cent of the estimated values
of the farms mortgaged. There was thus an increase of $698 in the
average size of the mortgages, and of 16.1 per cent in the ratio of
debt to value of farms mortgaged.
In the same period, the number of rented farms increased from
44,138 to 51,081, or from 24.7 per cent to 27.1 per cent of the total
number of farms in Minnesota.
Combining mortgage encumbrances with tenancy on a value basis,
gives results as follows:
Value of all farms in Minnesota 
Value of rented farms 
Value of mortgages on full-owner farms 
Value of mortgages on part-owner farms' 
Value of managed farms 
Total values not owned by owner operators
Per cent of value of farms in Minnesota not owned
by operators 
 43.1 48.8
Per cent of value of farms in Minnesota owned by
operators' 56.9 51.2
Thus the farmers of Minnesota, on January 1, 1925, owned only
51.2 per cent of the estimated value of the farms in the state. The
1920 1925
$3,301,168,325 $2,393,741,745
1,09,182,613 801,226.969
254,475,222 267,026,995
59,822,000 80,042,000
50,234,658 19,930,059
1,877;453,84o 1,225,515,740
Estimated on the basis of percentage .of full-owner operated farms mortgaged. There
may be an error in this; but it ought not seriously to affect• the comparability of the resultsbetween census periods.
2 This does not include the value of farm mortgages that farm operators may hold against
other farms, or the value of other farms that they own and rent to others.
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• comparable figure for 1920 was 56.9 per cent, which indicates a
decline from 1920 to 1925 of 5.7 per cent.
In 1910, only 46.0 per cent of the owner-operated farms in Minne-
sota were mortgaged, and the mortgages averaged only $1,864 per
farm-26.4 per cent of the estimated value of mortgaged farms. The
operators of Minnesota farms at that time owned 65.5 per cent of
the value of the farms in the state. The comparable figure for 1900,
however, is only 52.5 per cent and for 1890, only 52.0 per cent. Thus
the percentage of the farm values owned by the operators of farms
increased considerably from 1900 to 1910, but since 1910 the situation
has reversed and a larger and larger percentage of the values of Minne-
sota farms has passed out of the hands of the operators into the hands
of the landlords, mortgage holders, and employers of managers, until
the percentage owned by them in 1925 was about the same as in 1890.
Between 1920 and 1925, there were 1,378 farm bankruptcies in
Minnesota, as compared with 337 between 1910 and 1920. A corn-
parison of bankruptcies among farmers in Minnesota and in neighbor-
ing states is shown in Table I.
TABLE I
BANKRUPTCY AMONG FARMERS, 1910 TO 1925
State 1910 10 1919
1920 to 1925
Minnesota  337 1,378
North Dakota 718
2,406
South • Dakota  249
8 1 6
Montana  463
1,737
Iowa  690
2,492
Wisconsin 78
522
Illinois -  409
697
In all states there have been considerably more bankruptcies in
the last 6 years than in the preceding io years. No doubt a majority
of the farmers that lose their farms give them up without going
through bankruptcy, either by letting their contracts go by default or
by giving a deed to the holder of the mortgage. The proportion of
failures going through bankruptcy has increased greatly in late years,
so that the above figures exaggerate the change.
The agricultural census of January I, 1925, included a question
asking for "the total amount of other debts which you owe, not se-
cured by mortgages on real estate." But the Census Bureau has not
tabulated the answers.
A special survey of 240 farms made in Minnesota in the fall of
1924, just before the census was taken, showed an average non-mort-
gage indebtedness of $694 per owner-operator and $1,147 per tenant.
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT IN MINNESOTA 7
The year 1924 was the best Minnesota farmers had had since 1919.3
No doubt some debts had already been paid off that year. The $694
of non-mortgage indebtedness of owner-operators consisted of personal
and collateral loans and store credit. The latter was 27.2 per cent of
the total. The $1,147 of indebtedness of the tenant-operators was
14.7 per cent store credit.
In a survey of 157 farm families in the fall of 1925, Carle C.
Zimmerman, of the University of Minnesota, found that the average
interest of borrowed funds amounted to $260. This survey covered
seven communities. The lowest average amount of interest paid per
farm in any community was $68 and the highest, $620, in the Black-
duck (Beltrami County) and Tyler (Lincoln County) communities,
respectively. The average paid on mortgage debt during the year was$172, with a minimum per farm of $11 in the Blackduck area, and a
maximum of $353 in the Zumbrota area (Goodhue County). The
average amount paid on all other indebtedness, not including insur
ance, was $109, with a minimum by communities of $41 and a maxi-
-
mum of $231. The average amount paid on all indebtedness other than
insurance was $281, which was only slightly more than the $260 paid
out for interest on borrowed funds.
Another survey made by Dr. Zimmerman in 1926, in the vicinity
of Benson, Crookston, Litchfield, Mora, Spring Valley, and Tracy,
included 215 owners and 120 tenants. The average interest paid dur-
ing the previous year amounted to $334 per owner, or $454 per in-
debted owner. The Tracy area (Lyons County) averaged the highest
per indebted owner and the Mora area (Kanabec County) the lowest.
These areas paid respectively $779 and $176. The tenants averaged$89 of interest paid, or $99 per interest-paying tenant. The owners
had reduced the average indebtedness on their farms $147 during the
year and their other indebtedness :344. Tenants had no payments
to make on the farms they were operating but made payments on non-
mortgage indebtedness amounting to $91. Both owners and tenants
in this 1926 survey were expending annually more of their income to
pay interest bills than for debt reduction.
The foregoing data present a situation that needs very careful
consideration. Involved in. it are elements that are at the very founda-
tion of our rural civilization. It is the purpose of this bulletin to
uncover as many as possible of the real facts as to • this situation,
discover their significance and their causes, and show their relation to
3 A rough index of gross incomes for Minnesota farmers in recent years runs about asfollows: 1919, 234; 1920, 16o; 1921, 109; 1922, 130; 1923, 149; 1924, 181; 1925, 181; and1926, 188. The comparable net incomes run as follows: 232, 149, 86, 109, 121, 177, 202,
and 210.
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the credit institutions that have been established and to their manner
of functioning.
While the study was of Minnesota conditions, its findings will
no doubt apply in large measure to many other -states.
MORTGAGE ENCUMBRANCE
The mortgage encumbrance of farms is important from the stand-
point of credit, because in terms of dollars it represents by far the
largest use made of credit in agriculture. To understand long-term
credit for agriculture, we must analyze carefully the conditions de-
termining mortgage encumbrance.
The principal data available concerning mortgage encumbrance are
those collected each ten years by the Census bureau, and those col-
lected in the special farm census of January 1, 1925. In the 1920
and the 1925 censuses a mortgage was defined to include "all debts
secured by instruments locally called 'mortgages'; also all debts rep-
resented by judgment notes, confessions of judgments, deeds of trust,
deeds with vendor or lien clause, bonds, or contracts for title, or any
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Fig. I. The mortgaged farms in the United States increased about 9 per c
ent
between 1890 and 1920. The 1925 agricultural census shows that between 1920 
and 1925
mortgaged farms declined nearly 2 per cent. "Unknown" farms are those wh
ose debt
status was not reported. Preliminary reports of the 1925 census do not show h
ow many
farms failed to report on mortgage debt.
other legal instruments (other than mechanics'. liens or crop liens) that
partake of the nature of mortgages upon real estate."4 Mortgage
encumbrance thus includes the so-called "land contracts" under which,
in Minnesota, considerable land is sold to young farmers. Generally
speaking, a farmer selling his farm asks for a cash payment amounting
to at least half .the sale price, but there is a pronounced tendency to
extend this limit to two-thirds. Also, many farms are sold on a con-
4 Census 1920, Vol. VI, Part I, P. 479.
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tract for deed with the buyer paying down in some cases less than a
third of the purchase price.5
Situation in 1925
To understand the mortgage situation in Minnesota in 1925, as pre-
sented in earlier paragraphs, it must be considered in relation to the
other facts presented in Table II. According to these facts, the actual
number of mortgaged owner-operated farms decreased over 3000 be-
tween 1920 and 1925, in spite of the fact that the total number of farms
in the state increased nearly 10,000 in the same period. In terms of
percentage, only 48.6 per cent of the owner-operated farms were mort-
gaged in 1925, as compared with 52.4. per cent in 1920. This is an
unexpected development, quite contrary to prevailing impressions. One
is inclined to doubt the authenticity of the census figures. There was,
however, a similar development in North Dakota, Montana, Wisconsin,
Illinois, and some other states (Table III). For the whole group of
west north central states, there was a decrease of o.6 per cent in the
number of owner-operated farms mortgaged. A part explantion is the
increase of nearly 7,000 in rented farms and of 3,600 in part-owner
farmers in Minnesota during this period. This no doubt represents, in
part, a substitution of landlord ownership for mortgaged-operator own-
ership. Many heavily mortgaged farms no doubt reverted to their
former owners or passed into the hands of mortgage holders, who are
far less likely to have mortgages against them than their "shoe-string"
operators. Any foreclosure or its equivalent is likely to work out in
this way. No doubt the decrease in the average size of farms from 169
to 160 acres in this period and especially in the value per acre from $109
to $79, has made it possible for more persons to own them without
mortgages. The lower land values are, other things being the same, the
lower the proportion of farms likely to be mortgaged. (See Fig. 4.)
This is just the contrary of what occurred when land values rose
rapidly from 1900 to 1920. Table III shows that for the west north
central states as a whole, 51.8 per cent of the farms were mortgaged
in 1920 as compared to 43.1 per cent in 1900. Another circumstance
related to the foregoing is the probable reduced turnover of farms
during this period. Only about a fifth as many sales of farm land were
reported to the Minnesota Tax Commission during 1922-25 as during
1912-15, but the sales data from county records in two counties in-
dicate that a large proportion of the sales in recent years have been
recorded as for $1, hence are not reported to the tax commission.
5 During survey work in 1924 a farmer was interviewed in Pope county who sold Too
acres of land in 1917 to a German tenant for $12,000 upon a payment of $1,000 and the bal-
ance on contract for a deed. Many farms• were sold during the land boom with very small
payments down, and some have been sold in that way since.
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Whenever sales fall off, the number of new mortgages written is likely
to fall off also. Many of the transfers made, it has already been ex-
plained, were to the mortgage holders. It is also common belief based
on observation that an unusual proportion of recent purchasers of farms
could pay cash in full. The net effect of all the foregoing would be
the elimination of many old mortgages and the writing of relatively
fewer new ones.
TABLE II
CREDIT AND RELATED TENURE CHANGES IN MINNESOTA BETWEEN 1920 A
ND 1925
1920. 1925
t. No. of farms  178,478 
188,231
Owner 132,744 
136,382
Full-owner  112,880 
112,906
Part-owner 19.861 2
3,476
Managed  1,596 
766
Rented in full  44,138 
51,683
2. Size in acres (all) 169.3 159.7
Full-owner 144.9
132.5
Part-owner 234.2 2
22.4
Managed 277.6
292.6
Rented 198.5
189.1
3. Value per acre (all)  $109.23 $ 79.63
Full-owner  
( -$ 80.85
1 $104.30
Part-owner t 
1 $ 69.45
Managed $11337 $ 88.88
Rented  $120.85 $ 83.0.3
4. Full-owner and part-owner farms mortgaged
No. mortgaged 69,545
66,319
Per cent of total reporting 52.4
48.6
No. farms unknown 9,113
5. Full-owner farms mortgaged
No. reporting amount 57,58; 52,184
Per cent of total reporting 51.1
46.2
Average value of farms $16,o8o $11,736
Average amount of mortgage $4,419 $5,117
Ratio of mortgage to value 27.5 43.6
Average size, acres t 144.6
Average value per acre 
$ 81.13
6. Value of all mortgagest  $445.731,000 $495•569,400
* Data not available.
t The 1920 census does not give size of mortgaged farms.
This is an estimate. The census reports mortgage indebtedness for full-owner fa
rms
only. In this estimate the part-owner and the managed farms are assumed to have the sa
me
proportion of debt as the full-owner farms. The Bureau of the Census used this method
 in
a 1920 estimate (mimeographed release). The mortgage debt in 1920 on rented farms was
estimated as 11.7 per cent of the value of all rented farms. The Bureau of Agricultural E
co-
nomics, U. S. Dept. Agr., obtained a figure of 9.2 per cent for the United States in a specia
l
survey made in 1920. It is here assumed that the debt on rented farms increased betw
een
1920 and 1925 at the same rate as the encumbrance on full-owner farms, which increased fr
om
14.3 to 22.1 per cent.
The principal circumstance making one doubt the adequacy of the
above explanation is the actual increase of $700 in the average size of
the mortgages during this period. So far as census data are available,
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there never has been a time when mortgages and land values have not
increased together. During this period, however, many old mortgages
were rewritten at higher amounts, in order to liquidate short-time debts
incurred just before the break in prices of farm products, or to cover
new losses arising from operations in 1921, 1922, and 1923. These in-
creases' may have been large enough to more than offset the decrease
in size of mortgages written against new purchases after land values
broke in 1921.
TABLE III
PERCENTAGE OF OWNED FARMS MORTGAGED IN MINNESOTA COMPARED WITH NEIGHBORING
STATES AND WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1890 TO 1925
Area 1925 1920 1910 1900 1890
Minnesota 48.6 52.4 46.9 43.3 45.4
North Dakota 63.8 71.1 50.2 30.3 47.9
South Dakota 62.4 57.0 37.4 35.3 51.1
Montana 54.6 59.5 20.6 13.4 14.4
Iowa 55.6 54.2 51.2 52.1 52.8
Wisconsin 55.9 59.1 51.1 44.9 42.1
Illinois 35.5 38.5 38.4 37.9 36.3
East north central states* 39.4 42.6 40.5 38.5 37.1
West north central statest 51.2 51.8 45.6 43.1 47.3
United States 35.5 37.2 33.2 30.0 27.8
* Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
t Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas.
But this explanation takes no account of the fact that not only were
old mortgages increased on many farms, but that some farms with
no mortgages in 1919 now have mortgages. The effect of this is
to increase the number of mortgages and decrease the average size,
because such mortgages are likely to be small. If popular impression
is in any way a safe guide in this matter, it suggests an increase in
number of mortgages from this source that would more than offset
the decrease from causes already mentioned. ,
If a considerable number with mortgages failed to answer the mort-
gage questions, as was suggested in the opening paragraph of the study,
this would account for everything that appears in the data. It would
give too small a percentage of mortgaged farms, but probably would
not greatly affect the size of mortgages-there is little reason to sup-
pose that more small mortgages would not be reported than large ones,
or vice-versa.
Survey Data
Data on this point substantiate these conclusions. In the fall of
1924 a survey was made of 240 farmers in six areas in Minnesota
located as indicated in Table IV. Of the 172 of these farmers who
' owned their farms, 106, or 65.5 per cent, had mortgages on them.
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This is to be compared with the 50.4 per cent census average for the
counties in which these areas are located. The 240 farmers were taken
at random in each area. That they constituted fairly representative
samples of the counties in which the surveys were made is shown by
the close correspondence with the county averages in mortgage debt
per farm and ratio of debt to value. Also, as shown in Table V, while
there are slight differences in the average size of mortgaged farms when
compared by counties, the average size of farms in six counties departs
only 3 acres • from the Census average for the six counties in which
the survey was taken.
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF DATA FOR 172 FARMS IN 6 COUNTIES WITH CENSUS DATA FOR 1925 AND 1920
Survey Census 1925 Census 1920
Area
Per
No. of cent
owned farms
farms mort-
gaged
Ratio
of
debt
to
value
Mort-
gage
debt
per
farm
Per
cent
farms
mort-
gaged
Ratio
of
debt
to
value
Mort-
gage
debt
per
farm
Per
cent
farms
mort-
gaged
Ratio
of
debt
to
value
Mort-
gage
debt
per
farm
Steele  30 6o.o 40.2 $6,100 42.0 49.7 $7,620 49.8 30.6 $5,054
Cottonwood 13 84.6 40 o 9,763 6o.5 44.4 9,880 65.8 24.8 5,334
Pope  30 50.0 40.0 5,700 50.5 37.9 5,194 52.3 26.7 3,592
Norman  20 85.0 49.7 4,812 53.9 40.8 4,519 53.4 26.6 2,620
Chisago .. ..... 39 48.7 40.0 4,266 43.7 38.3 3,613 43.3 26.3 2,548
Hubbard  
Average for
40 65.o 30.6 1,567 57.7 37.2 1,811 64.2 23.9 1,320
all  
Average for
65.5 40.3 4,776 50.4 42.4 5,072 53.4 26.7 4,257
state • • • • • • • 48.6 43.6 5,117 . 52.4 27.5 4,119
TABLE V
COMPARISON BY COUNTIES OF 1925 CENSUS AND 1924 SURVEY FOR SIZE OF MORTGAGED FARMS
Steele Cottonwood Pope Norman Chisago Hubbard Average*
Census, 1925 135 190 190 157 100 132 146
Survey, 1924 107 197 176 234 112 115 149
* Average for state, 145 acres.
Moreover, the six surveys seem fairly to represent the state as a.
whole in both these respects. Of the 106 owner-operators who had mort-
gages on their farms in 1924, 36 did not have when the 1920 census
was taken, 22 had been re-written at a higher amount, 32 had been
renewed at the same figure, and only 16 had not been disturbed (Tables
VI and VII). This represents a great deal of mortgage activity, mak-
ing possible a considerable change in the mortgage status of the f arm-
e'rs. The point in which we are mainly interested here is the change in
size of mortgages and percentage of farms mortgaged. Twenty-two
mortgages were increased an average of $1,740, considerably more than
'
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the census average for the state; 36 new mortgages were written for
an average of $4,680, somewhat less than the state average. The orig-
inal data show that of the 36 new mortgages 8, averaging $2,071, were
entirely to finance or cover indebtedness in connection with buildings
or general farm expenses; 24, averaging $5,520, were to cover land
purchases only; and 4, averaging $4,575, were to cover pm-chases plus
building or other farm• expenditures.
Unless the 28 new mortgages covering purchases represent a smaller
proportion of farmers buying on mortgage than for the same number
of farmers making purchases in these areas before 1920, the 8 new
mortgages written for other .purposes represent an addition to the per-
centage of farms mortgaged, and as their average is only $2,071, they
would reduce the average size of all mortgages and offset in part the
increase of $1,740 in the amount of - the 22 old mortgages. As already
indicated, more of the farmers buying recently may have paid cash
in full, but surely not enough more to offset the i i new mortgages.
The sample is very small, however, and not too great reliance can be
placed in it. It is entirely possible that more than 52.4 per cent of
the farms in these areas were mortgaged in 1920; and that a careful
survey then might have given a figure also over 6o per cent.
Calculations from the data in Table VI show that of the new mort-
gage debt for other than purchase, 62 per cent arose from new build-
ing operations, 8 per cent from purchase of new equipment, and 30
per cent from general farm expenses, chief of which was taxes. In
Hubbard County three of the farms borrowed on mortgages to clear
land. The new mortgages written for these purposes in 1920, 1921, and
1922 were mostly to cover obligations incurred before the break in
farm prices came, and were carried for a time on notes or open accounts.
The new mortgage debt incurred for these purposes in 1923 and 1924
represented the beginnings of a revival of agricultural development.
Additional evidence of the same general nature is contained
in the results of two surveys of rural living in Minnesota made in
1925 and 1926, respectively.6 The 1925 survey included 123 owner
operators who paid at least $125 interest on mortgage and other debts
(about $25 in one new cut-over county). At least 6o per cent had mort-
gages on their farms, as compared with the 1925 census average of 47
per cent. The 1926 survey included 149 owners who paid at least
$125 interest on mortgage and other debt (about $100 in one partly
cut-over county). At least 64 per cent had mortgages on their farms
as compared with 52 per cent in the 1925 census. The two surveys
include 12 sections well distributed over the state, and the farmers were
chosen entirely at random.
Unpublished data from surveys made by Carle C. Zimmerman, Rural Sociologist, Minn.
Agr. Expt. Station.
TABLE VI
MORTGAGES OF 172 OWNER FARMERS IN MINNESOTA WRITTEN OR INCREASED BETWEEN 1920 AND 1924
(Classified according to purposes.)
Old mortgages increased
County
No.
of
farms
Old mortgages
renewed*
To buy more
land
To finance new
buildings
To purchase
equipment
To finance general
expenses
No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount
Steele 16 10 $ 42,700 o $ o 2 $ 3,500 2 $1,000 0 $ o
Cottonwood 8 5 56,800 o o o o o o o o
Pope 14 11 53,960 o o 3 8,140 I 1,000 2 5,000
Norman 16 9 41,600 2 5,000 2 2,600 3 2,500 4 3,000
Chisago 14 6 18,700 o o o o o o o o
IIubbard 21 13 19,300 0 0 2 2,500 i• 800 4 3,200
All areas 891 54 $233,060 2 $5,000 9 $16,740 7 $5,300 To $11,200
* Twenty-two renewed for higher amount, 32 at same amount.
t Net. including 16 mortgages not disturbed.
County
Old mortgages
increased .
all purposes*
• New mortgages
To buy land To erect buildings To buy equipment To finance general expenses All purposes*
No. Amount . No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount
Steele 2 $ 4,500 4 $34,600 3 $14,700 o $ o $1,000 6 $ 44.900
Cottonwood 0 0 3 23,600 o o o o o o 3 23,600
Pope 6 14,140 1 7,000 2 2,500 0 0 I • 900 3 10,400
Norman 7 13,100 8 27,800 o o 0 0 2 3,800 8 31,600
Chisago o o 7 35,000 2 7,700 0 0 1 1,000 8 43,700
Hubbard 7 6,500 5 4,500 1,500 o o 2 2,750 8 8,750
All areas 22 $38,240 28 $132,500 8 $26,400 0 $ o 7 $9,450 36 $168,310
* The number of mortgages does not total as given because some mortgages w:re written for more than one purpose.
TABLE VII
MORTGAGES OF 172 OWNER FARMERS IN MINNESFTA WRITTEN OR INCREASED BY YEARS BETWEEN 1920 AND 1924
(Classified according to purposes.)
Years
No. .
of
farms
Old mortgages
renewed
Old mortgages increased
To buy more
• land
To finance new
buildings
To purchase
equipment
To finance general
expenses
No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount
1920 10 3 $ 13,500 0 $ 0 0 $ 0 0 $ 0 1 $ 4,500
1921 17 4 9,100 0 0 1 600 1 500 2 700
1922 18 13 70,800 I 2,000 2 4,000 o o 2 1,100
1923 16 Io 35,200 o 0 2 3,500 2 1,500 I 400
1924 28 24 104,460 I 3,000 4 8,64o 4 3,300 4 4,500
All years 89 54 $233,060 2 $5,000 $16,740 7 $5,300 xo $11,200
Years
Old mortgages
increased
all purposes*
New mortgages
To buy land
No. Amount No.
1920 I $ 4,500 8
1921 2 1,81,,. 10
1922 5 7,xu., 5
1923 3 5,400 3
1024 11 19,440 5
All years 22 $38,240 28
To erect buildings To buy equipment To finance general expenses All purposes*
Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount
$ 27,900 2 $ 6,500 0 $ o
58,800 5 18,900 o o
11,700 o o o 0
9,200 1 1,000 0 0
. 
24,900 o o o o
1 $1,000 7
I 1,000 13
2 4,800 5
2 1,150 6
1 1,500 5
$ 35,400
78,700
16,5oo
11,350
26,400
8132,500 8 $26,400 0 $ o 7 $9,450 36 $168,350
* The !lumber of mortgages does not total as given because some mortgages were written for two or more purposes.
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In the 1926 survey, 59 owner farmers in two areas were studied
especially from this point of view. On January I, 1925, when the census
was taken, 35, or 6o per cent of the 59, had mortgages on their farms.
The nearest comparable 1925 census figure is 48 per cent. Fourteen
of these 35 mortgages had been written since January I, 1920. Eight
were new mortgages; and 6 were old mortgages renewed, all for an
increased amount. Of the 8 new mortgages, 3 were entirely to pur-
chase land and one was for the purpose of buying more land and
covering general expenses. The rest were for buying equipment, erect-
ing buildings, and covering general expenses. The average size of the
6 old mortgages was $18,00o before renewal and $23,400 after re-
newal. The new mortgages averaged only $6,1o0. The nearest com-
parable average mortgage debt, as shown by the 1925.  census, for these
two areas was $9,000. The survey data show about $9,600. The old
mortgages renewed are larger than the census average shown and the
new mortgages are less.
Between January I, 1920, and January I, 1925, only 13 of the 35
mortgaged owner-operators covered in the survey made any payments
on the principal. One of these resulted from a sale of part of the land
and another from inheritance. The average for the remaining i I was
$1,260, or $252 per year. This is an extremely poor showing and
indicates forcefully the severity of the present agricultural depression.
From January 1, 1925, to the time the survey was • made only 8 had
made payments on the principal of their mortgages:
Further evidence that the census data are too low is found in a
survey made at the beginning of 1924 in Kittson, Marshall, Polk, Red
Lake, and Wilkin Counties by the Division of Agronomy and Farm
Management, of the University of Minnesota, under the supervision
of Dr. Andrew Boss. Of 106 owner farms studied, 90, or 83 per cent,
were mortgaged. The 1925 census average for these counties is 61
per cent. Even allowing for the fact that the sample probably was
not entirely random, as indicated by a considerably larger average, value
and size of farms than was reported by the 1925 census, there is still
evidence that the census data are too low.
It seems that there is more mortgage indebtedness on Minnesota
farms than the 1925 census data indicate. The 1920 census data, also,
may be too low. We can not be sure, therefore, that the number of
farms mortgaged has increased since 1920.
The impression is common among farm mortgage agencies in the
Northwest that there has been a considerable increase in mortgage in-
debtedness. From the end of 1919 to 1924, federal land bank loans in
Minnesota made a net increase of 135 per cent and the number of
loans increased from 4,052 to 7,729, or 91 per cent. The volume of
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT IN MINNESOTA 17
joint stock land bank loans increased 46.6 per cent. Net loans of in-
surance companies increased 104 per cent between 1919 and the end
of 1923. The Minnesota Rural Credit Bureau began to operate in.
1923 and by the end of 1924 had loaned approximately 32 million dol-
lars, involving a little more than 6,000 loans. The loans made since
1920 by the Minnesota Rural Credit *Bureau, the Federal Land Bank
of St. Paul, the joint stock land banks, and insurance companies are
recorded in Table XXV. The farm mortgage companies report an
increase in volume of business with the exception of some private in-
vestment companies.
Table II estimates, even on the basis of tkie census figures, an increase
of $49,000,000, o'r ii per cent, in the total farm mortgage indebtedness.
The rest of the apparent increase mentioned may merely represent a
shifting to those agencies of mortgages formerly held by banks, private
institutions, and individuals. This no doubt occurred in large volume,
especially from banks to the Minnesota Rural Credit Bureau, but it
hardly seems that such shifting could account fo'r all the increase in
volume of loans reported by the loaning institutions named.
Changes Since 1890
The 1890 census was the first to report the percentage of farms
mortgaged. Table III traces the changes that have taken place in
Minnesota and neighboring states and for the United States as a whole.
In several of the west north central states, especially the Dakotas and
Minnesota, there was a decline between 1890 and 1900. The group as
a whole showed a decline from 47.3 pet cent in 1890 to 43.1 per cent
in 1900. This no doubt reflects the rapid expansion to new lands and
the homestead movement that was going on during this period. For
the rest of the states in the Northwest and even the states mentioned,
since 1900, and for the United States as a whole, as indicated in
Figure 1, the percentage of farms mortgaged has gradually increased.
For the United States as a whole it has been at the rate of about 3.0
per cent each ten years. As there was a decline of 1.7 per cent from
1920 to 1925, there will be less than the usual increase in the present
decade, unless a rapid swing forward sets in soon, or unless the census
data are in error, as above suggested.
There is nothing alarming about this increase. In fact, it would be
remarkable if it had not occurred. The average value of farms in
Minnesota and the west north central group of states multiplied by
six between 1890 and 1920, and multiplied by more than two when
prices are expressed in terms of dollar's of the same value, that of the
year 1925 (Table VIII). The decline in values between 1920 and 1925
was only a little more than the decline in the general price level. If
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no more farms were mortgaged now than in 1890, the situation would
be that those buying farms now, many of them young men buying
their first farms, at an average of $12,717, are as able to pay cash for
them, or are able to pay off their mortgages as rapidly as when farms
were worth $2,910 on the average. These $2,910 in 1890 were worth
$5,728 in dollars of 1925. Surely it can not be said in fairness that
Minnesota farmers are going backward just because they have not quite
kept up in wealth with the rapid increase in land values. As before
stated, it would be remarkable if they had kept up.
TABLE VIII
INCREASE IN VALUE OF FARMS FROM 1890 TO 1925
Year
Values in actual dollars Values in 1925 dollars
Index
West north West north number
United central _ Minnesota United central Minnesota used*
States states States states
1925 $ 7,776 $14,875 $12,717 $8,125 $15,543 $13,288 95.7
5920 50,284 22,307 58,496 7,584 16,450 13,640 135.6
1910 5,471 10,464 8,085 8,456 16,173 12,496 64.7
5900 2,896 4,385 4,329 5,701 8,632 8,522 50.8
1890 2,909 3,245 2,910 5,726 6,388 5,728 50.8
* Bureau of Labor index of wholesale prices, expressed in terms of prices in 1925. For
1910, 1920, and 1925, the index used is the average of the monthly indexes for the six months
preceding the date of taking the census.
In this connection, it must not be forgotten that a good part of the
value of our farms must be earned on the land in each generation. One
farmer pays off his mortgage, sells his farm, and moves to town with
all his wealth. The man who buys it probably has to start with a new
mortgage. Or perhaps the farmer passes the farm on to one of his
sons, in which case the son who gets the farm probably has to mortgage
it to pay the other heirs. Only if land values were standing still and
if farms were being passed to heirs unencumbered, could it be said that
agriculture was not holding its own if the percentage of mortgaged
farms was increasing. Agriculture in the United States is doing far
better than that-it is keeping nearly constant the percentage of farms
mortgaged, at the same time financing the transfer to the cities of a
large group of retired farmers in each generation and paying off a
large group of heirs who have left the farm. It has financed a
large part of the expansion of agriculture that has taken place when
some of the other sons have been helped to start in new farming areas.
It has also provided the education (often not very good) for the young
people who leave the farms for the city. The flow of wealth from the
city to the country is a mere dribble compared with all this in the
other direction.
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The Farm Owner's Equity
It is the custom of many persons to focus attention upon the absolute
size of the farm mortgage today as compared withthat in earlier times,
and to point out, as is done in Table IX, that the mortgages averaged
$5,117 in 1925 and only $814 in 1890, and thus make it appear that
the farmers are getting more and more in debt on even the farms that
they own.
TABLE IX
CHANGES IN MORTGAGE DEBT AND OWNERS' EQUITIES ON MORTGAGED OWNER-OPERATED
FARMS, MINNESOTA, 1890 TO 1925
Year
Value
per
farm
Mortgage
debt
per farm
Owner's
equity
per farm
Percentage
increase
in debt
Percentage
increase
in equity
Ratio of
debt to
value
1925 $11,736 $5,117 $ 6,619 15.8
—43.2 43.6
1920 16,o8o 4,419 11,661 137.1 124.3 27.5
1910 7,062 1,864 5,198 62.4* 85.of 26.4
1900 3,9571 1,148§ 2,809 41.1 59.6 29.0*
1890 2,574 814 1,760 • • • • • • 31.6
* Increase 1890 to 1910, 129 per cent.
f Increase 1890 to 1910, 195.3 per cent.
t Estimated. The average value of mortgaged farms in 1920 and 1910 is nearly the
same as the average value of all fully owned and partly owned farms. For 192o, the respective
figures are $16,511 and $16,080; and for 1910, $7,538 and $7,062. For the two periods, the
average value of owned farms exceeds that of mortgaged farms by 4.5 per cent. It is assumed
that about the same relation existed in 5900. The average value of owned farms in 1900 was
84,07o, which, reduced by 4.5 per cent, amounts to $3,957.
§ The ratio of debt to value in 1890 and 1910 for mortgaged farms is given in the
census. The ratio in 1900 is estimated at 29 per cent by interpolation from 1890 and 1910.
Table IX sets over against these figures the increase in the owner's
equity per farm, that is, the value of the farm over and above the
mortgage. It appears that from 1890 to 1910 the equities increased
more rapidly than the debt, and from 1910 to 1920 only a little less
rapidly. While the total mortgage debt of all the owner farms of
Minnesota was increasing from $37,709,000 in 189D to $254,475,000 in
1920, or 575 per cent, the owner's equities were increasing from
$176,552,000 to $1,877,000,000, or 963 per cent. Relatively, the farm-
ers were getting less in debt. At least, they were getting more out of
debt. This relationship is usually stated in terms of the ratio of debt
to value of mortgaged farms, as in the last column of Table IX. The
mortgaged owner-operators of Minnesota farms owned all but 27.5 per
cent of the value of their farms in 1920, as compared with all but
31.6 per cent in. 1890.
All these figures are expressed in terms of the dollar of 1925 in
Table X. It thus appears that even absolutely the debt increased very
little from 1890 to 1920. The increase from $814 to 4419 in mort-
gages on Minnesota owner-operated farms now appears to have been
an increase only from $1,602 to $3,259, or 103 per cent.
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TABLE X
CHANGES IN MORTGAGE DEBT AND OWNERS' EQUITIES ON MORTGAGED OWNER-OPERATED
FARMS, MINNESOTA, 1890 TO 1925, EXPRESSED IN DOLLARS OF 1925
Wholesale
Year price
index*
Value
per farm,
1925 dollars
Mortgage Owner's equity
debt per farm, per farm,
1925 dollars 1925 dollars
Percentage
increase
in debt
Percentage
increase
in equity
1925 95.7 $12,263 $5,347 $6,916 64.1 - 19.5
1920 135.6 11,855 3,259 8,596 13.1 7.0
1910 64.7 10,915 2,881 8,034 27.5 45.3
1900 50.8 7,789 2,260 5,529 41.1 59.6
1890 5o.8 5,o66 1,602 3,464 • • • • • •
* Bureau of Labor Statistics, index of wholesale prices reduced to 1925 bacis. For 1910,
1920, and 1925, the index used is the average of monthly indexes for the six months precediag
the date of taking the census.
To explain the abrupt change after 1920, other circumstances should
be considered. A large proportion of the mortgages in force in 1925
were contracted between 1918 and 1921, when land prices were high.
Most of those that were drawn for five years have been renewed. The
value of the average mortgaged owner-operated farm in Minnesota has
declined from $16,080 in 1920 to $11,736 in 1925. If there had been
no increase in the average size of the mortgages, if it had remained at
$4,419 instead of increasing to $5,117, the ratio of debt to value would
still have increased from 27.5 per cent to 37.5 per cent, owing to the
decline in land values, and the owners' real equities would have fallen
off 37.2 per cent during the five years.
How this increase has worked may be illustrated by a particular
farm, bought, let us say, in 1919, for $21,000.
1919 1925
Bought for  $21,000 Could be sold for  $16,000
Paid cash  14,000 Payments on principal  none
Mortgage  7,000 Mortgage  7,000
Equity  14,000 Equity  9,000
Equity in 1925 dollars  10,728 Equity in 1925 dollars  9,000
Ratio debt to value  33.3 Ratio debt to value  43.7
If the operator had paid off $1,00o on the principal in 1920 and
just held his own since, his ratio of debt to value would be 37.5 instead
of 43.7 in 1925. If this operator, while paying nothing on his prin-
cipal, had increased his mortgage to $8,000 when renewing it, his ratio
of debt to value would be 50.0 instead of 43.7 in 1925. The opposite
of this was taking place between 1890 and 1920, when land values were
rising. A farmer who paid $5,000 cash on a $10,000 farm in Minne-
sota in 1910, without paying a cent on the principal, had his equity
increased from S5,000 to approximately $19,000 by January, 1920, land
values increasing from $45 to $109 per acre, or 142 per cent, during
that period. Even when this $5,000 and $19,000 are expressed in the
1925 price level, the real equity on the farm had increased from $7,728
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to $14,112. From 1890 to some time after 1910, the effect of this in
raising owners' equities in mortgaged farms was so great that it more
than offset the increasing number and size of mortgages.
Since 1920-21 transfers of land have been fewer and old mortgages
have been largely renewed at their original high figures, with the result
that the mortgaged owners' real equity in the farm is less today than
it was in 1910. This is a serious situation. It means that a large part
of the material gains from agricultural progress since 1910 have been
wiped out so far as the present generation of farmers is concerned.
Movements in Land Prices
Nor is it proper to lay the blame for much of this on the agricul-
tural population. Figure 2 shows that movements in the general level
of prices have been the major factor in the movement of land values.
A permanent change in general price levels should be fully and imme-
diately reflected in land prices. Most of the small movements in price
level, howevero are obviously temporary, and farmers, like other business
men, can be expected to adjust their business affairs on this assumption.
By no means do all business men so adjust their affairs; but we still insist
that they should, and we ask the same of farmers. The longer contin-
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Fig. 2. Changes in prices of Minnesota farm land from 1890 to 1925, compared
with changes in all commodity and other price levels. In general, the movements of land
prices have followed movements in the general level of prices.
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uous movements of the price level, however, such as from 1897 to 1916,
nearly everyone takes at face value, and until more is known about
them and their causes, there is nothing else to do. The rapid upward
price level movement from 1917 to 1920, followed by the sudden down-
ward movement of 1921 and 1922, belongs in the class of short-time
swings which should have been recognized as such and discounted. But
business in general failed to do this, and it would be unfair to hold the
agricultural class especially at fault for their failure in this respect. A
sharp break in prices was expected immediately at the close of the
World War. When it did not come, but was followed by a second
period of inflated prices, both business men and farmers lost their
balance. Some eminent economists concluded that the new high price
level had come to stay. - That they were partly right is evidenced by
the fact that price levels have not yet returned to their pre-war level,
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Fig. 3. This chart is like Figure 2 except that it starts with 1890 as the base point
of ioo (data in Table XI). This means that the curves compare conditions at any point
with those in 1890. It appears that prices of farm products have been above the all-
commodity or general price level ever since 1900 except for a brief period in 1921, and
that they are now considerably higher relatively. Farm land prices rose until 1920. They
rose from 1890 to 1900 when prices were just holding their own. There was a large
increase in improved land during this decade (Table XII).
but for several years have been fairly stable at between 50 and 6o
points above the pre-war level, and that there are better reasons for
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believing they will not decline far than for thinking they will sink to
the level of 1913.
Farm land prices in Minnesota rose considerably faster than the
general price level, from 1910 to 1920, and have declined at about the
same rate since (Fig. 2 and Table XI). The net result of the whole
movement is a farm land price now 75 per cent above 1910, and a
general price level only 57 per cent above 1910. Data of the Minne-
sota Tax Commission show that from 1914-15 to 1920 land values rose
only 96 per cent as compared with 130 per cent for the general price level.
This does not mean, however, that farm land prices are now too
high. Included in the value of farm land is the value of buildings. It
appears that even when adjustment is made for the changing price level,
buildings increased in value per acre during the period (Table XII).
Improvement in roads and transportation should also help to make land
values rise faster than the general price level.
TABLE XI
COMPARISON OF MOVEMENT OF MINNESOTA FARM VALUES AND COMMODITY
PRICE LEVELS, 1899 TO 1925
Value of Index numbers 1910 = 500 Index numbers 1890 = 100
farm 
 .
land Value of Farm All Non-agri- Va'.ue of Farm All
per farm land commod- commod- cultural farm land commod- commod-
acre per acre ities sties products* per acre ities ities
1890 $ 18.22 39.9 79.6 . 67.6 • • • Ioo Ioo no
1900 25.21 55.3 79.6 68.2 89 140 101 100
1910 45.62 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 250 148 126
1920 109.23 239.4 223.3 211.1 236 599 312 280
1925 79.63 174.6 157.3 153.1 161 437 226 197
* Index on 1910-14 basis back to 1910 obtained from supplement to Agricultural Situation.
p. 30. Index from 1900 to 1910 obtained by letter from Bureau of Agricultural Economics,
Washington, D. C.
The percentage of land improved has remained nearly constant since
1900. This is because new land has been taken into farms at about
the same rate that land already in farms has been cleared.
TABLE XII
CHANGE IN IMPROVEMENTS PER ACRE ON MINNESOTA FARMS, 1890 TO 1925
Percentage
of farm
land
improved
Census
value of
buildings
per acre
Value of buildings per acre
in dollars of
1910* 1925*
1890 59.6
• • • • • • • •
1900 70.3 $ 4.20 $ 6.43 $10.63
1910 71.0 8.79 8.70 14.53
1920 71.1 18.23 11.70 19.35
1925 19.86 12.01 19.86
* Adjusted on the basis of an index compiled from value of building material and wages
of labor, with allowance for the fact that the census valuations always lag behind current pr:ces.
t Not available.
t Not obtained in 1925 census-probably a slight increa:e.
24 MINNESOTA TECHNICAL BULLETIN 55
More important than either of the foregoing is the fact that prices
of farm products rose much faster than other prices from 1900 to
1915. The index for prices of farm products rose 32 points during
the period; for non-agricultural products, 10 points; and for the gen-
eral price level, 21 points. This is shown clearly in Figure 2.
Subtracting the adjusted value of buildings given in Table XII
from the value of land and buildings at each decade, both expressed
in 1925 dollars, gives the values in the last column of Table XIII. The
increase since 1890 is no more than is warranted by the land improve-
ments and the rise of prices of farm products above that of the general
price level.
TABLE XIII
VALUE PER ACRE OF LAND AND BUILDINGS, BUILDINGS, AND LAND ALONE, MINNESOTA,
1890 TO 1925
Value of land Value of • Value
and buildings, buildings, of land,
1925 dollars* 1925 dollarst 1925 dollars
1890  $35.86 t t
1900  50.21 $10.63 $39.58
1910  70.52 14.53 55.99
1920  80.55 19.35 6
1.25
/925  83.21 19.86 63.35
* It is assumed that the estimate for land and buildings combined is not affected by the
lag in valuation of buildings.
f From Table XII.
Data not available.
Changes in Size and Number of Farms
Somewhat related to changes in mortgage debt are changes in size
and number of farms. The land in farms in Minnesota increased until
1920 (Table XIV). The figures for the 1900 census are usually con-
sidered much too high because of the method of taking that census.
This has accentuated the increase for that decade, and reduced the in-
crease for the following decade. The rate of increase between 1910
and 1920 was only 9.2 per cent. The slight decrease since 1920 may
actually represent a certain amount of abandonment of land that took
place in certain parts of the state; but more likely it represents omissions
in census taking. The large increase in number of farms between 1920
and 1925 is also believed by many to be due in considerable part to the
method of taking the 1925 census. While the total acres for farms have
been decreasing, the number of improved acres increased until 1910.
The 1925 census obtained no data as to improved land,. but an estimate
on the basis of crop acreage would be about 115 acres.
Small farms are to some extent .a substitute for mortgage debt.
The smaller the farms purchased, the more likely they are to be
paid for in full, or nearly so. On the other hand, if farms are too
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT IN MINNESOTA 25
small, those who purchase them on mortgages will pay off the mortgages
slowly. The more valuable the mortgaged farms in Minnesota are, the
greater is the tendency for a higher percentage. of their value to be
mortgaged (Fig. 4). This relationship does not always hold true be-
cause of other conditions which may conceal the general tendency.
TABLE XIV
NUMBER OF FARMS, ACRES OF LAND IN FARMS, ACRES PER FARM, AND IMPROVED ACRES PER
FARM IN MINNESOTA BY CENSUS YEARS, 1890 TO 1925
Census year
Number
of
farms
Acres of
land in
farms
Acres
per
farm
Improved
acres
per farm*
1925 188,231 30,059,137 159.7 125.0
19201: 178,478 • 30,221,758 169.3 120.4
1910 156,137 27,675,823 177.3 125.8
1900 154,659 26,248,498 169.7 119.2
1890 116,851 18,663,645 159.7 95.2
* "Improved land includes all land regularly tilled or mowed, land in pasture which has
been cleared or tilled, land lying fallow, land in gardens, orchards, vineyards, and nurseries, and
land occupied by farm buildings." Census 1920, Vol. V, p. 23.
't Not reported in 1925 census. Figures are estimated by finding ratio between improved
land and crop land harvested as reported for 1919 in the census of 1920 and assuming the same
relationship between crop land harvested and improved land in 1924. If data for land in farm-
steads were available in the 1925 census a more direct method of computing would be available.
t Data 1890 to 1925. See 14th census, Vol. V, P. 47.
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Change in Tenancy
It is not always realized that tenant farming and mortgage indebt-
edness are substitutes one for the other. The sooner young men are
able to buy farms on mortgages, the less tenancy there will be. The
percentage of Minnesota farms rented has increased from 12.9 to
27.1 since 1890 (See Appendix, Table III), about 3 per cent each
ten years. In the five years from 1920 to 1925 the increase was 2.4
per cent as compared with 3.7 per cent during the preceding ten years.
This represents an appreciable speeding-up of the rate of increase since
1920. In absolute numbers, there were 6,945 more tenants in 1925 than
in 1920, and only 26 more full owners. This increase in number of
rented farms is due to the fact that. many tenants have remained ten-
ants who in ordinary times would have bought farms under mortgages.
They have done this (1 ) because they have saved little during the last
five years, (2) because they have been waiting for the price of land to
reach bottom before buying, (3) because the old incentive to purchase
in order to realize upon the rise in value of land has been weakened
considerably, and in some cases (4) because they have been marking
time while waiting to decide whether or not they should continue farm-
ing. Some part of the increase in tenancy is no doubt due to fore-
closures. Most of those who have had farms come back into their
hands have rented them to farmers' sons wanting to become tenants,
to farmers who have lost their farms, or to neighboring farmers who
have operated them as additional rented land. That the last has hap-
pened frequently is demonstrated by the increase of 3,612 (18 per cent)
in the number of partly owned farms during this period.
The "Agricultural Ladder"
The relation between tenancy and mortgage indebtedness is so im-
mediate that it is worth while to analyze tenancy in some detail. It has
been customary to assume that tenancy is merely a step, or rung, in
the ladder by which the farm population ascends to full ownership;
that most tenants were formerly laborers and eventually became mort-
gaged owners and then owners free of mortgage. To this succession
of tenure stages, the term "agricultural ladder" has commonly been
applied. In 1920, out of each 1,000 male persons 10 years of age or
over working on Minnesota farms, 166 were laborers on the home
farms, 200 were laborers on other than home farms, 156 were tenants,
6 were managers, 246 were mortgage owners, 193 were owners free of
mortgage, and the status of 33 was unknown. This gives a clear picture
of the relative importance of the steps in the agricultural ladder in
Minnesota.. Roughly, 37 per cent were in the labor stage, 16 per cent
were in the tenant or manager stage, and 47 per cent were in the owner
stage, of whom more than half had mortgage debt.
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Not all farmers, however, pass over the same route to ownership.
The "agricultural ladder" is too simple a description of what happens.
Some pass directly from farm laborers on the home farms to tenants,
and some work as laborers on other farms before becoming tenants.
In the former case, probably the parents help the son or son-in-law
financially. Many get enough help from parents that they omit the
tenant stage altogether. Some inherit the home farm in full or in part,
in the latter case having to pay off the other heirs. Some earn money
while working in cities, mines, or forests that is used as cash payments
on land purchases. The last is especially true in the cut-over section
of the state.
TABLE XV
How FARM OWNERS ACQUIRED STATUS IN FOUR SOUTHERN MINNESOTA COUNTIES*
Per cent
Home farm to owner (never were tenants) 40.0
Home farm to hired laborer to owner 21.6
Home farm to hired laborer to tenant to owner 14.5
Home farm to tenant to owner 53.4
Other industry to owner 5.7
Other industry to hired laborer to owner 1.5
Other industry to hired laborer to tenant to owner 2.2
Other industry to tenant to owner 1.1
* Courtesy of Dr. W. J. Spillmann. These unpublished data were obtained in a survey
of 738 owner farmers in four southern Minnesota counties by the United States Department of
Agriculture in 1917.
Many owners do not climb to ownership over all the rungs of the
agricultural ladder. Only 14.5 per cent of those raised on the farm
and 2.2 per cent of those coming from other industries among 738
owner farmers in 1917, were first farm laborers working out, then
tenants, and finally owners (Table XV). About one-tenth of the own-
ers came from other industries. This figure is too high for the period
since 1921. The recent depression in agriculture has reduced the rate
at which people go from other industries into agriculture. Of the 90
per cent who came out of agriculture direct, 21.6 per cent omit the
tenant stage only, 13.4 per cent the hired laborer stage only, and 40.0 per
cent both. A total of 36.1 per cent included the hired laborer stage
somewhere, and 27.9 per cent the tenant stage. To these figures may
be added 3.7 per cent for hired laborers and 3.3 per cent for tenants
that came out of other industries.
Inquiries as to farm experience were included in the 1920 census
for the first time. Of every ioo Minnesota farm owners in 1920, 38
reported previously operating a farm as a tenant and 45 reported work-
ing on a farm for wages. For each Ioo in the tenant stage in 1920, 57
had previously worked for wages. These percentages are little higher
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than those in Table XV, which include only four southern counties in
917.
Figure 5 is conclusive evidence that there is such a thing as an
agricultural ladder. As farmers grow older, a smaller and smaller per-
centage are tenants. In 1920 less than 14 pe'r cent of those from 45
to E4 years of age were tenants, as compared with 65 per cent of those
under 25 years. Figure 5 also shows that between 1890 and 1920 the
PERCENTAGE OF TENANCY IN EACH AGE GROUP FOR FARM
CENSUS YEARS FROM 1890 TO 1920 FOR MINNESOTA
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Fig. 5. As farmers grow older a smaller and smaller percentage of them are
tenants. Between 1890 and 1920 the percentage of tenants in each age group increased
very perceptibly. This chart indicates that the rate of ascent on the agricultural ladder
is declining. Data from Tenancy in United States, Census Monograph IV, p. 92.
percentage of tenants in each group increased very perceptibly. In the
most numerous group, 25 to 34 years old, for example, only 21 per
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cent of the arm operators were tenants in 1890, as compared with 47
per cent in 1920.
There is further evidence in Figure 5 that the rate of ascent of the
agricultural ladder is slowing down. Between 1890 and 1910 the per-
centage of tenancy increased most rapidly in the lowest age group; in
the next decade, in the 25-to-34 age group; and between 1910 and 1920,
in the 35-to-44 age group. Between 1910 and 1920 the change is very
pronounced. This could indicate, however, that fewer young men are
now passing through the tenancy stage, and those that became tenants
while young are still tenants in unusual numbers. Up to 1900, at least,
it seems that farmers' sons were becoming tenants at earlier ages. The
smallness of the increase in the 25-and-under group between 1910 and
1920, is probably accounted for by the fact that the war experience
,kept more than the usual number of farmers' sons from becoming ten-
ants. There is little evidence of an increasing "permanent tenant"
INCREASE IN LABORERS AND TENANTS, 1880 TO 1910
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Fig. 6. Laborers as well as tenants increased faster than owners in Minnesota
frcm 188o to 1910. Between 1910 and 1920 both owners and tenants increased in relative
numbers. This may reflect the decrease in size of farm families and the growing tendency
of farm boys to leave the farms early in life.
1920
class. In 1890, but 66 out of every 1,000 farm operators in Min-
nesota were still tenants at 55 years of age and over; and in 1920, the
number had increased to only 70.
The whole story of the agricultural ladder can not be told, however,
in terms of tenants and owners. Tenancy takes the place of the farm
laborer stage as well as of the owner-operator stage. Laborers work-
ing on Minnesota farms were increasing more rapidly than tenants in
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actual numbers from 1880 to 1910. There were 141 more farm laborers
in each 1,000 in 1910 than in 188o, as compared with an increase of
only 6o in the number of tenants in the same period. Both tenants
and laborers were increasing at the expense of owner operators and
as has already been pointed out, free owners at the expense of mort-
gaged owners. Between 1910 and 1920, however, both owners and
tenants increased in relative numbers. The decrease in laborers was
in those working at home. This probably reflects the decrease in size
of farm families and the growing tendency of farm boys to leave the
farms early (Fig. 6).
The census of 1925 reports 35 per cent of all cash tenants and 30
per cent of all share or other tenants in Minnesota as renting from
relatives. A study of cash rents made by the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture in 1920 showed that cash rents on farms rented
from relatives averaged nearly a third less than on other farms in Iowa
and southern Minnesota.7 In the rest of Minnesota the difference
seemed to be less, but still was significant. Share leases also favor
tenants that are related to the landlords.
Tenancy in Relation to the Credit Problem
It is not the purpose of this study to analyze the tenancy problem,
but merely to show its relation to the credit problem. Young men ordi-
narily become tenants because they do not have money enough or finan-
cial backing enough to buy farms. If they could get more financial
backing, or credit on less security, fewer would be tenants and more
would be owners. Also, many would become tenants sooner than at
present. But these would not necessarily be desirable changes. It is a
mistake to have young men become tenant operators before they are
old enough and experienced enough to become successful managers. It
is an even more serious mistake for them to become owner operators
before they are ready. As long as they have only limited capital, they
can earn a larger return upon it by using it as a tenant's working capital
than as an owner's fixed investment in land. Working as a farm laborer,
even as a hired laborer away from home, is an excellent experience for
a young man. This is especially true if his employer is more successful
or more progressive than his father, which is often the case. Tenancy,
especially on a share basis, is a valuable apprenticeship in farm man-
agement, especially if under a progressive landlord or one who ha 
been a successful manager. More liberal credit arrangements, there-
fore, might easily. do more harm than good. They would lead to a•
waste of the human and soil resources of the nation.
7 Relation of Land Income to Land Values, by C. R. Chambers, U.S. Dept. Agr. Bull.
1224, PP. 54, 100-102. 1924.
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On the other hand, keeping a young man a farm laborer after it is
time for him to marry and establish a home for himself is extremely
disheartening and a waste of the best resources of the nation. It is
almost as disheartening and wasteful to keep a farm family in the tenant
stage after it is ready to establish a farm home of its own.
Mortgage Encumbrance in Minnesota as Compared with That of
- Other States
A smaller proportion of the owner-operated farms in Minnesota in
1925 were mortgaged than in any neighboring states except Illinois
(Table III). It had relatively fewer mortgaged farms than the aver-
1926
Upper Flyure •
Pemente.ye fenanniered
Lower Tiyure-
RalioDe61 lo Value
Fig. 7. Percentage of owner farms encumbered and ratio of debt to value
of full owner mortgaged farms, by sections, 1925. The state is divided into 7
sections according to type of farming and other geographic conditions. These
sections are designated as follows:
I Northwest small grain section
II Central small grain and dairy section
III Southeastern small grain and dairy section
IV Corn, small grain, hogs, and beef cattle section
V Corn, small grain, and dairy section
VI Potato, truck, and dairy section
VII Cut-over section.
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age of all the west north central states (Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas) ; but more than
the average of all the east north central states (Wisconsin, Illinois,
Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio). The figures indicate that the percentage
of mortgaged farms in Minnesota decreased between 1920 and 1925 as
in all neighboring states except South Dakota and Iowa. The percent-
age of mortgage indebtedness increased less between 1900 and 1920
than in all neighboring states except Iowa and Illinois. Between 1890
and 1900 the states west of Minnesota showed large decreases in the
percentage of farms mortgaged; those to the east, small increases. Min-
nesota showed a small decrease. About the same comparison can be
made as to ratio of debt to value of mortgaged farms. Iowa and Wis-
consin had appreciably higher ratios than the rest of the group in
1925-Iowa, because of a spectacular increase, and Wisconsin, mostly
because it always has been high. Iowa showed a much larger increase
in the average size of mortgages between 1920 and 1925; and South
Dakota and Illinois a somewhat larger increase.
It thus appears that Minnesota occupies an intermediate position
between the east central and the west central states in most phases
of mortgage encumbrance. Wisconsin has always had a great deal of
mortgage encumbrance and very little tenancy. Many of its people came
from countries of Europe where the ownership of small farms under
mortgages has become an established arrangement. Also, its type of
farming favors such a system of tenure. The Dakotas and Montana
show the influence of being comparatively new regions with a relative
scarcity of capital.
Distribution of Mortgage Indebtedness Within the State
This comparison with neighboring states helps us to understand con-
ditions in different sections of Minnesota. The percentage of farmers
in Minnesota reported encumbered and the ratio of debt to value, by
sections, is given in Tables XVI and XVII for the census years from
1890 to 1925.
TABLE XVI
PERCENTAGE OF OWNED FARMS REPORTED ENCUMBERED, BY SECTIONS, IN MINNESOTA,
1890 TO 1920*
Section 1925 1920 1910 1900 1890
State 48.6 52.4 46.0 43.3 45.4
I 58.1 59.4 60.1 51.9 51.9
II 48.7 51.7 47.2 47.7 49.9
III 38.0 42.8 32.0 35.2 37.5
IV . 56.2 59.3 56.2 55.0 53.5
V 45.5 48.9 40.7 38.9 46.1
VI 44.5 47.3 41.6 36.9 36.4
VII 47.3 54.3 37.1 16.4 17.6
* See Figure 7 for outline of sections.
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Sections I and IV have a high percentage of farms mortgaged, like
Iowa and eastern North and South Dakota. Section IV is much like
Iowa in its mortgage encumbrance. Sections III, V, and VI resemble
western Wisconsin rather than Wisconsin as a whole. Section VII,
the new cut-over section, shows the same sort of increase in mortgage
indebtedness that occurred in Montana and to a lesser extent in North
Dakota. Previous to 1900 few farms in this section were sufficiently
developed to warrant loans being made on them as security. After from
20 to 25 acres have been cleared and subdued, the farmer often wishes
to borrow money in order to clear enough land to provide an income
large enough that he need not work away from home. As his cleared
acres increase, he needs better buildings, more dairy cows and ma-
chinery. For these reasons, the percentage of mortgaged farms grew
rapidly in Section VII and by 1925 nearly equaled the average for the
state.
TABLE XVII
RATIO OF DEBT TO VALUE OF MORTGAGED FARMS, BY SECTIONS, IN MINNESOTA, 1890 TO 1925
Section
Percentage of farm value mortgaged
1925 1920 1910 1890
State 43.6 27.5 26.4 31.6
I 
 42-4 25.4 25.6 32.5
II 43.4 28.9 25.8 31.5
III 444 29.2 27.8 33.0
IV 46.9 26.1 26.8 30.7
V 48.5 30.1 29 8 34.3
VI 
 46.2 28.4 247 25.2
VII 34.6 25.5 21.4 20.0
From 1920 to 1925 the percentage of far:Ms mortgaged decreased
in all sections of the state. The lowest decline was 1.3 per cent in
Section I, where conditions are probably more stable than in any other
area. The "land boom" of the post-war period is thought to have dis-
turbed this area very little. The greatest reduction in the percentage
of farms mortgaged was in Section VII, where it amounted to 7 per
cent. The reduction in the other areas varies from 2 to 5 per cent.
The explanation of this reduction has already been given. Some of
the differences shown are probably due to the functioning of the credit
mechanism.
All sections show an increase in the ratio of indebtedness to value
on owner mortgaged farms. The smallest increase was 9.1 per cent
in Section VII and the largest, 20.8 per cent in Section IV. Data for
the various sections of the state as to changes between 1920 and 1925
in per cent mortgaged, value of farm land and buildings, arid ratio of
mortgage debt to value are given in Table XVIII.
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TABLE XVIII
CHANGES IN PERCENTAGE MORTGAGED, VALUE OF LAND AND BUILDINGS, AN
D RATIO OF
DEBT TO VALUE, MINNESOTA, BY SECTIONS, 1920 TO 1925
Section Per cent mortgaged Value of land and buildings Ratio of debt
 to value
I —1.3 —31.0 +17.0
II —3.0 -25.3 +14.5
III —4.8 -25.2 +14
.2
IV -3.1 -36.5
+20.8
V —3.4 —25.1 +18.4
VI —2.8 —15.3
+11.8
VII —7.0 ±10.8 + 
9 1
These data show that in Section VII the value of land and build-
ings increased 10.8 per cent, in other sections it decreased from 15 to
36 per cent. This explains why the ratio of debt to value in Section
VII increased less than in other sections. The same relationship ap-
pears for the other areas, those with the largest decrease in land values
having the largest increase in ratio of debt to value, and thus in order
down to those with the smallest decrease in land values. The decrease
was greatest after 1920 where land values increased most between 1915
and 1920 and where the mortgages were largest absolutely as well as
relatively. As has been explained, the absolute increase in mortgage
indebtedness shown in 1925 was largely due to the refunding into mort-
gage indebtedness of non-mortgage indebtedness contracted prior to
1920.
Geographic Comparison of Mortgage Encumbrance and Tenancy
Combined
It will be remembered that when the value of rented farms was com-
bined with the mortgage indebtedness to discover the value of farm
real estate not owned by those who operate the farms, the percentage
was 48.8 for Minnesota in 1925. This means that the operators of
Minnesota farms own only 51.2 per cent of them. Similar data for
_189o, 1910, 1920, and 1925 for Minnesota and neighboring states are
given in Table XIX. This percentage has declined rapidly in all since
1910, less in Minnesota than in the Dakotas, but more than in Wisconsin
and Illinois. In Minnesota, the Dakotas, and Wisconsin, the percentage
was lower in 1890 than in 1910; in Illinois and Iowa, the decrease has
been continuous since 1890. In Iowa, only a little more than a third
of the.land is really owned by those who operate it, and there was the
startling decrease of 9.0 per cent between 1920 and 1925. In Minnesota
the comparable decrease was 5.7 per cent; in South Dakota, 10.3 per
cent.
CHANGES IN PERCENTAGE OF TENANCY FOR THE UNITED
STATES, VARIOUS GROUPS OF STATES, AND FOR MINNE-
SOTA AND NEIGHBORING STATES, 1880 TO 1925
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Fig. 8. In the period between 1910 and 1925, tenancy actually decreased in the
New England and the Middle Atlantic states, and between 1920 and 1925 it decreased
in the South Atlantic states. In the Atlantic Coast states as far south as Virginia,
the recent tendency has been for tenancy to decline. Tenancy increased only 1.6 per cent
in Wisconsin from 1910 to 1925 and only o.6 per cent in Illinois, while it increased 6.1
per cent in Minnesota. During the same 15 years it increased 20.1 per cent in North
Dakota. Between 1920 and 1925, tenancy in the United States increased only 0.5 per cent.
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TABLE XIX
PERCENTAGE OF REAL ESTATE VALUES OWNED BY OPERATORS IN MINNESOTA AND
NEIGIIBORING STATES, 1890 TO 1925
Areas I92c I920 19I0 1890
Minnesota 51.2 56.9 65.5 51.9
North Dakota 50.5 56.4 72.1 69.1
South Dakota 43.1 53.4 63.2 59.6
Montana 57.2 64.7 72.5 86.7
Iowa 35.4 44.4 51.5 54.8
Wisconsin 57.5 61.5 66.o 65.5
Illinois 39.4 40.1 45.8. 52.9
Progress of Individual Farmers
Altho the farm wealth of Minnesota and neighboring states is pass-
ing more and more into the-hands of landlords and mortgage holders,
the progress of individual owner-operators may not be so discouraging.
Discussion of farmers' conditions in recent years has been too much
in terms of those who bought land between 1918 and 1921. In the
survey of 172 owner-operated farms made in the fall of 1924, 49 had
bought farms between 1916 and 1921, and 36 before 1900. After de-
ducting gains in gifts received since the time of purchase, all groups
show a net gain except that of 1919-20, when land prices were at
their highest (Table XX). Farmers who bought before the land
boom all made substantial net gains and even those who bought after
1920 made some gain, on the average. Many of the older farmers,
who purchased land in the earlier years, had prospered and sold out
prior to the time of the survey. It is probable that those not included
in the earlier periods because they had sold their farms previous to
the survey would have shown a higher net gain than the average for
those who continued to farm. On the other hand, numerous instances
were related by farmers and bankers of individuals who had bought
land at peak prices in 1919 and 1920, who had, prior to the survey, lost
their farms, with whatever equity they had in them. The 1921-24
group in Table XX contains only 2 farms purchased in 1924, 2 in 1923,
and 4 in 1922, leaving II purchased in 1921. Many of the farms bought
in 1921 were purchased for considerably more than they would sell for
in 1924.
The average net gains per farm for these 7 groups, after deducting
gains from inheritance since purchase, were $14,751; $13,523; $11,255;
$5,824; $6,297, -$89 and +$249. The large losses sustained by some
in the last two groups were possible because these individuals had a
considerable accumulation when they bought their farms. In many
instances persons buying farms during the land boom period sold other
farms at high prices just prior to their new purchase.
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TABLE XX
NET GAINS OR LOSSES PER FARM, GROUPED ACCORDING TO TIME OF PURCIIASE*
37
1880-90 1891-1900 1901-10 1911-15 1916-18 1919-20 1921-24
No. of farms 
 
II 26 35 32 21 28 19
Average acres per farm 
 
211.3 151.3 188.3 138.8 138.6 110.0 114.7
Net assets per farm at purchase.  $ 889 $ 1,118 $ 3,169 $ 4,813 $ 6,729 $7,690 $7,112
Net assets per farm in 1924 
 15,912 15,730 15,005 10,761 13,405 7,790 7,570
Gain in net worth from time of
purchase to 1924 
 
15,023 14,612 11,836 5,948 6,676 Ioo 458
Gain from gifts 
 272 1,089 581 124 379 189 209
Smallest net gain or largest loss
for any farm 
 5,375 3,025 3,050 1,865 1,100 -10,800 -8,960
Largest net gain for any farm 
 44,629 45,200 36,175 20,800 25,650 6,910 5,210
* Source of data, 1924 survey.
The survey farms are regrouped according to time of purchase in
Table XXI. The second column of the table gives the number of
owner-operated farms in each group. The rest of the table gives the
relation of total liabilities to total assets at the time of the survey, in
the following order: (I ) the number of farmers having no liabilities,
(2) the number whose total liabilities were respectively from i to 20
per cent, 21 to 40 per cent, 41 to 6o per cent, 61 to 8o per cent, and
81 to Too per cent of their total assets. The data indicate two impor-
tant conclusions: ( 1) that excessive debt is confined to farmers in the
last three groups. Only one farmer among 104 who had bought farms
before 1916 had debts amounting to more than 61 per cent of his assets,
while 12 out of 68 who purchased farms after 1916 were indebted for
more than 61 per cent and 6 for more than 81 per cent of their total
assets. (2) Of the farm owners included in this survey, 3.5 per cent
are near bankruptcy, and 4 per cent more probably do not have re-
serves sufficient to remain solvent if crops should fail for a year or
two or if the price level for the products they have to sell should
decline still lower for a considerable time.
The data given were taken four years after deflation set in, and in
the meantime many farmers in Minnesota had gone bankrupt and many
more had turned over their farms to their creditors without legal pro-
ceedings. An inquiry conducted by the United States Department of
Agriculture in 1923 found that between 1920 and March, 1923, 4 per
cent of the owner-farmers in fifteen corn and. wheat producing states
had lost their farms by foreclosure and 4.5 per cent more had let their
farms go to creditors without legal proceedings.8 This inquiry also
found that the number of tenants who lost their savings was materially
larger than the number of owners.
8 The Year in Agriculture, 1923, by Henry C. Wallace. U.S. Dept. Agr. Yearbook,
pp. 9-1o.
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TABLE XXI
TOTAL LIABILITIES COMPARED WITH TOTAL ASSETS, FARMS GROUPED BY
PERIODS OF PURCHASE
Total No. of farmers having indebtedness indicated
Purchase No.
periods of farms No debt 1-20 21-40 41-60 61-
8o 8i-too
per cent per cent per cent per cent per cent
1881-90  II 7 4 o o o 
o
1891-1900  26 17. 8 I o o 
o
1901-10  33 7 18 7 3 o 
o
1911-15  32 9 9 ro 3 1 
o
1916-18  21 3. 4 s 4 I 
1
1919-20  28 4 5 7 6 2 4*
1921-24  19 I 2 9 3 3 
1
Total 172 48 50 42 19 7 
6
Per cent loom 28.0 29.0 24.5 11.0 4.0 3.5
* In one case the percentage of liabilities was 122.
The progress of the farmers with mortgages in 1924 and of the
172 owner-operators is analyzed in further detail in Table XXII. On
the average, the mortgage indebtedness of the mortgaged group appears
to have increased slightly, but the increase in farm values from $8,500
to $11,800 since purchase had more than offset this, so the percentage
of debt had decreased from 55.7 to 40.3 per cent. For the whole
group, both unencumbered and encumbered owners, the ratio of debt
to value had decreased more than half. In due time, however, these
owner-operators will retire or die and their farms will pass into the
hands of new owners under heavier mortgages. This will probably
keep the percentage of owners' equities from ever rising greatly. Even
while this particular group has been reducing its ratio of debt to value
from 49.7 to 23.3, new farmers have been buying farms under heavy
mortgages, so the community average has probably been increasing.
TABLE XXII
VALUE AND DEBT AT PURCHASE AND IN 1924 ON OWNER-OP.ERATED FARMS IN 1924 SURVE
Y
Mortgaged All owner-
owner-operated operated
farms in 1924 • farms
No. of farms 
Value of real estate per farm
At purchase 
In 1924 
Debt per farm at purchase 
Mortgage debt per farm, fall of 1924 
Percentage of debt at purchase 
Percentage of mortgaged debt in 1924 
Decrease in percentage of mortgage indebtedness by 1924
112 172
$ 8,5oo $ 7,650
$11,800 $12,600
$ 4,700 $ 3,800
$ 4,800 $ 2,935
55.7 49.
40.3 23.3
15.4 26.4
At the rate of payment of mortgage principal indicated in Table
XXII, farmers will be a long time in getting out of debt. The increase
in land values has increased their equities. It is sometimes urged that
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farmers should not worry about getting out of debt. Corporations
do not worry greatly over their bonded debt so long as it is in reason-
able proportion, and why should farmers worry over mortgage debt?
One significant answer to this is that if each generation of farmers
does not pay off a good Fart of its mortgage debt, and the farms con-
tinue to make. their contribution to the city in the form of payments
to retiring farmers and heirs to farm estates, it will be only a short
time until all the land will be owned by landlords and mortgage holders.
It is probable, however, that less farm wealth will be bequeathed to the
city in the future, as smaller farm families ft-lean fewer city heirs.
Sources of Long-term Loans
The principal sources of long-term loans used by Minnesota farm-
ers are local banks, former owners of the land, the Federal Land Bank
of St. Paul, Minnesota Rural Credit Bureau, retired farmers and other
individuals, investment companies, life insurance companies, and joint
stock land banks.9 With the exception of the federal land banks, joint
stock land banks, and the Minnesota Rural Credit Bureau, there are
no satisfactory sources of data as to the volume of loans furnished by
the various agencies. Table XXIII presents data gathered for small
groups in six Minnesota counties in the fall of 1924. While the sample
is small, the data probably show fairly well the relative importance of
the principal sources. As might be expected, the largest volume of
loans from any single source was from former owners of the land,
with local banks ranking second. The former owners were supplying
a little more than one fourth of the mortgage loans. No other source
of long-term farm credit has been or probably could afford to be as
liberal in assisting tenants with little credit or capital other than stock
and machinery to become independent operators of their own farms.
.In Hubbard County, in the cut-over region, there are few retired
farmers because of the relative newness of farming. Hence in this
area less than one-tenth of the loans were frbm this source.
Retiring farmers often give credit for a large part of the selling
price when disposing of their farms. It is not uncommon for the
purchaser to make an initial payment of even less than To per cent of
the purchase price. Sometimes a contract for deed is given and at
other times the seller takes a mortgage on the farm. Another method,
used when the seller wants considerable cash, is for the buyer to
borrow as much as possible on a first mortgage and the seller to take
a second mortgage for the unpaid balance. When land prices have
gradually advanced for several years, owners are much more willing
to sell with small payments down; when the land market is stagnant,
By source is meant the person or institution that advances the money direct'y to the
farmer and not the ultimate resting place of the loan.
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it is often the only way a sale can be made. The plan usually works
out well when prices of land are advancing, but when the farms hav
e
been purchased just preceding a great deflation, it has too often resulted
in the loss of the invested capital.
TABLE XXIII
PERCENTAGE OF MORTGAGE LOANS ON OWNER FARMS FROM
 VARIOUS SOURCES,
MINNESOTA, 1924
Steele
Source County
Cottonwood Polk
County • County
Norman
County
Chisago
County
Hubbard
County
All
areas
per cent
Local banks  31
Former owner  24
Federal banks  I
Joint stock land banks  o
Minnesota Rural Credit
per cent
8
35
I
5
per cent
14
28
37
6
per cent
23
27
21
I
per cent
28
• 26
14
I
per cent
26
io
5
4
per cent
21
27
12
3
Bureau . o 15 6 -
18 43 10
Private and retired farm-
ers 21 2 7 7
50 3 9
Investment company 3 20 I 6
2 7 8
Life insurance company o 10 6 6
o o 4
Relatives 20 4 o 3
I 2 6
Local banks were the source of about one-fifth of the owner-farm-
ers' mortgage loans. This figure is probably too high, as in 
many
cases the loans reported as obtained from banks were made by 
the
banks as agents of insurance companies and investment companies. Th
e
farmers obtaining the loans did not know, in many cases, whether th
e
bank made the loan directly or merely acted as agent. It is apparent
that with the exception of the former owners of the land, farmers s
till
go oftener to their local banks for mortgage loans than to any o
ther
one source. In some states, the state department of banking collect
s
data on farm mortgage loans carried by state banks, but in Minnesota
such data are not segregated . for state banks. The total loans secured
by farm real estate held by national banks in Minnesota as of June
30, 1925, amounted to $22,077,000.1° We do not know how many loans
were originally made to farmers and later sold; neither do we know
how many were bought from a mortgagee or how many were on farms
in other states or on rented farms. If the above sum was all on Min-
nesota farms, on the basis of a total estimated mortgage indebtedness
of $495,569,400 as of January I, 1925, the national banks held 4.5 per
cent of the total. Reports of the comptroller do not show the amount
of farm mortgage loans held by national banks in Minnesota in 1920.
It has been estimated that 26 per cent of all loans were held by Minne-
sota banks in 1920.11 The amount of loans car'ried by banks as invest-
'-() Report of comptroller of currency, 1925, p. 632.
11 Farm Mortgage Loans by Banks, Insurance Companies, and Other A
gencies, by V. N.
Valgren and Elmer E. Engelbert. U.S. Dept. Agr. Bull. 5047, P. 3.
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ments must not be confused with the amount originally made by them.
Many of the loans they make are sold to insurance companies, to loan
companies, to investment banks, and to an individual clientele.
The Federal Land Bank of St. Paul ranked third in importance as
a source of farm loans in Minnesota and the Minnesota Rural Credit
Bureau fourth. Practically all loans made by these institutions are
on owner-operated farms. The joint stock land banks make some
loans on rented farms. There is nothing to prevent an owned farm
from becoming a rented farm after the loan is once closed. In
the survey, the Federal Land Bank was found originally to have made
12 per cent and the Minnesota Rural Credit Bureau io per cent of the
total volume of mortgage loans. The amount of net loans outstanding
as of January 1, 1925, and January 1, 1920, for the Federal Land Bank
of St. Paul, the joint stock land banks, and the Minnesota Rural Credit
Bureau, together with the percentage that the outstanding amounts were
of the estimated mortgage debt on all owner-operated farms is shown
in Table XXIV. These percentages and the percentage of loans sup-
plied by each of the three sources as found in the 1924 survey check
rather closely. In the survey, the credit bureau was found to have
supplied io per cent of the loans and the calculated figure is 9.3 per cent.
After only two years of operation the Minnesota Rural Credit Bureau
had loans outstanding equal to between 9 and To per cent of the total
mortgage debt on owner-operated farms.
TABLE XXIV
NET LOAN OF FEDERAL FARM LOAN SYSTEM AND MINNESOTA RURAL CREDIT BUREAU IN
MINNESOTA, 1920 AND 192i
January I, 1925 January 1, 1920
Mortgages-on Mortgages on
Volume owner-operated Volume owner-operated
farms farms
per cent per cent
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul.. • $34,382,200 9.7 $14,607,900 4.6
Joint stock land banks 33,748,339 9.5 5,953,600 1.9
Minnesota Rural Credit Bureau 32,296,148 9.3 . ..
* Not in operation. Organized in 1923.
The Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, on January I, 1925, was sup-
plying about 9.7 per cent of the mortgage loans on owner-operated
farms and the four joint stock land banks about the same percentage
(Table XXIV). Together they had outstanding about 19 per cent of the
loans on owner-operated farms, as compared with 15 per cent as found
by the survey. Part of this discrepancy is due to the fact that the.
federal land bank began loaning in 1917 and the jo'nt stock land
banks in 1919. In the meantime, some of the farms with federal farm
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loans had become rented farms, for which class mortgag
e data were
not obtained in the survey. Moreover, joint stock land bank loans
are sometimes originally made on rented farms. Together, 
the three
institutions were supplying between 28 and 30 per cent of the
 mortgage
loans on owner-operated farms on January I, 1925. In 19
20, they were
supplying only 6.5 per cent.
TABLE XXV
NUMBER AND AMOUNT OF LOANS MADE, FROM DATE
 OF ORGANIZATION • TO
END OF 1927, BY YEARS
Federal Land Bank of 
Minnesota Rural Credit
St. Paul Joint stock land banks* 
Bureaut
Year No.
of
loans
Amount
Inter-
est
rate
No.
of
loans
Amount
Inter-
est
rate
. No.
of
loans
Amount
In-
ter
est
rate
per
per cent per cent
cent
1927 835 $4,940,800 5 116 $ 993,200 5%
971 $ 3,787,200 VA
1926 1,053 6,544,500 5 164 1,141,162
534-6 1,511 5,914,900 54
1922 572 2,850,200 5-5% 618 5,
440,010 51A-6 1,317 6,144,200 54
1924 737 4,284,500 5% 274 2,377,
800 51/2-6 5,338 27,590,400
51/4
1923 1,324 6,696,500 52 1,636 13,574,
100 6 794 3,867,100 . 51A
1922 1,849 8.338,400 51/2-6 1,451 13,685,750
6
1921 722 3,937,400 6 22 124,800
6
1920 615 3,616,400 5% 31 85
0,000 6
1919 1,430 5,921,700 51/2 661 5,953,600
6
1918 1,478 4,792,900 53/,
1917 869 1,i64,500 5-5'A
* No report for loans in 1927 was received from the Des Mo
ines Joint Stock •Land Bank.
t Not organized until 1923.
The Federal Land Bank of St. Paul began operations in 1917. The
first joint stock land bank operating in Minnesota was chartered in
1918 but transacted little business until the following year. Four more
were chartered in 1919 and one in 1922. Two of these five joint stock
land banks later combined with others so that at the beginning of 1927
there were but four operating in Minnesota.12 The Minnesota Rural
Credit Bureau was organized and began accepting applications for
loans in the latter half of 1923. The annual number of loans and the
volume of loans made from the time of organization to the end .of
1927 by the foregoing organizations, together with the prevailing rate
of interest, are shown in Table XXV. Both the federal land bank
and the joint stock land banks loaned nearly 6 million dollars in 1919.
The slump in loans made in 1920 and 1921 was due to the litigation
then in process to determine the constitutionality of the federal farm
loan act. The volume of loans made in 1922 and 1923 by the federal
" The four joint stock land banks operating in Minnesota were:
Southern Minnesota Joint Stock Land Bank, Redwood Falls, Mina.
Bankers Joint Stock Land Bank, Milwaukee, Wis.
Des Moines Joint Stock Land. Bank, Des Moines, Iowa.
Minneapolis Joint Stock Land Bank, Minneapolis, Minn.
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farm loan banks in Minnesota is the largest reached by them. This may
be partly accounted for by the accumulation of applications from the
two previous years. Their amortization plan of loaning and the rela-
tively low interest rates charged were also factors. Other important
factors were the shifting of loans from mortgage companies, owing to
the great contraction of their market for loans among individuals, and
also the considerable number of farmers who just at that time were
funding their non-mortgage debts into mortgages. The large volume
of loans made by the Minnesota Rural Credit Bureau in 1924 largely
accounts for the reduced volume by the federal land bank and the
joint stock land banks during that year. The volume of loans made
by the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul in 1925 was lower than in
any year since 1917. Conservatism and the desire to safeguard the
institution from unsound loans may account for this. The investigation
of joint stock land banks by the Treasury and the fact that one of the
four banks operating in Minnesota was placed in receivership on July
I, 1927, may largely account for the low volume of loans made by
them in 1927.
.The Minnesota Rural Credit Bureau did a big business in 1924—
made 5,338 loans and loaned $27,590,400. Great pressure for money
was brought to bear through local banks in order to liquidate, so far
as possible, their "frozen" loans to farmers. There was a reaction
against this activity in the 1925 session of the state legislature. The
law was revised and the bureau reorganized. From 1925 to 1927 less
than 1,300 loans per year were made, as compared with over 5,boo
in 1924.
The growth in the outstanding volunie of loans in these new insti-
tutions has been continuous and pronounced. The Federal Land Bank
of St. Paul, from the time of its organization to the end of 1927, made
11,484 loans and loaned $53,087,600. At the end of the tenth year
of operation the number of loans outstanding was 2,844 less and the
money outstanding was $9,469,800 less than the total loans to that
date. This difference is due partly to the refunding of old loans into
larger ones, partly to loans paid off, and partly to amortization pay-
ments. At the end of 1927, the joint stock land banks had made 4,973
loans representing $44,140,422. From 1923 to the end of 1927 the
Minnesota Rural Credit Bureau had made 9,961 loans representing
$47,303,800. The institutions are too new to make a safe prediction
from the data at hand, but if not disturbed or curbed by legislative
action, it seems probable that their business will continue to expand for
several years.
Both the Federal Land. Bank of St. Paul and the Minnesota Rural
Credit Bureau have been less appreciated by the farmers in the southern
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tiers of counties in Minnesota than elsewhere in the state. Loans are
available in the *southern counties from other sources at nearly the same
rates, especially from retired farmers and insurance companies. Be-
sides, many farmers do not yet appreciate the amortization feature in
farm loans. The Rural Credit Bureau has probably loaned more liber-
ally in the cut-over section than has the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul.
In Hubbard County, for example, 43 per cent of the total volume of
loans among the farmers visited during the 1924 survey were obtained
from the former as compared with about 9 per cent from the latter,
including loans made by the joint stock land banks.
In both number and volume, and both absolutely and relatively to
the total number and value of farms, the loans of the Minnesota Rural
Credit Bureau have been larger in the northern and western counties
than in the southern counties. (See Appendix, Table I.) The northern
part of the state has been most discriminated against by the insurance
companies. This is• partly because the companies have regarded the
loans in the southern part of the state as being more conservative,, and
partly because the loans per farmer are necessarily much smaller in the
less developed sections of the tate. The expense of examining the
title and handling the management is as much for a $1,000 loan as
for a $ o,coo loan. In addition, the mineral and oil reservations com-
monly found in deeds to land in the cut-over section have been found
objectionable to the insurance companies and also to some commercial
loaning companies. In some cases, former deeds have reserved the
right to repurchase the land for a stipulated sum in case oil or mineral
is found on the land at any subsequent time. The federal land bank
and the Minnesota Rural Credit Bureau are permitted under certain
conditions to make loans to farmers having such titles to their farms.
I.oans may be made by the federal land banks on lands where oil,
gas, and mineral rights have been reserved or leased, provided such
lands are primarily agricultural. The land bank, however, inquires
into the extent to which exercise of such rights may interfere with the
use of the land for agricultural purposes and requires the borrower to
include in his mortgage a statement of all his rights under such reserva-
tion and leases and an agreement to apply his royalties to the payment
of the mortgage. Life insurance companies are still holding about twice
as large a volume of farm loans in Minnesota as the federal and joint
stock land banks combined. Life insurance companies are slowly taking-
up the idea of making amortized loans on farms. Their loans in Minne-
sota increased from $34,000,000 in 1914 to $116,000,000 in 1923. The
financing of long-term loans by relatives and retired farmers is alsa
relatively more important in the southern part of the state.
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On January 1, 1925, the Minnesota Rural Credit Bureau, the Fed-
eral Land Bank of St. Paul, and joint stock land. banks loaning on farms
in Minnesota are estimated to have each held about 7 per cent of the
estimated total mortgage indebtedness. National banks held 4.5 per
cent, state banks 20 per cent, and insurance companies 27 per cent
(Table XXVI). This accounts for the sources from which 72.1 per
cent of the total mortgage indebtedness is obtained. It will be re-
membered that the total mortgage indebtedness on January 1, 1925,
was estimated to be *495,569,400. Deducting the amount of mortgages
held by the sources named, there remains $139,798,403 in mortgages to
be held by former owners, retired farmers, and miscellaneous sources.
TABLE XXVI
ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF , LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS OBTAINED FROM SEVERAL
Date
Jan. I, 1925
Jan. I, 1925
June 30, 1925
Jan. I, 1925
June 30, 1925
Jan. I, 1925
Total
SOURCES IN MINNESOTA
Source Amount
Percent-
age of
total
Minnesota Rural Credit Bureau $ 32,296,000 6.5
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul 34,382,000 6.9
National banks* 22,077,000 4.5
Joint stock land banks 33,748,000 6.8
Insurance companiest 136,000,000 27.4
State banks $ 99,268,000 20 o
$357,771,000 72.1
* Report of comptroller of the currency, 1925, p. 632.
t The amount held by national banks is known. It equals 4.7 per cent cf the estimated
total mortgage indebtedness. V. N. Valgren, in U.S. Dept. Agr. Bull. 1047, estimated in 1920
that all classes of banks in Minnesota held 26 per cent of the total amount of farm indebted-
ness. It is here assumed that the ratio is about the same in 1925. Deducting 4.7 per cent
leaves 21.3 per cent to be held by state banks of all kinds. This method is used only for the
lack of data for a better approach.
$ Estimated actual for Dec. "31, 1923, was 8116,496,565 as shown by report of association
of life insurance presidents.
Data for the amount of loans held by the Minnesota Rural Credit
Bureau, the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, and the joint stock land
banks are official and complete. In estimatihg the total debt it has
been assumed that the value of part-owner farms bears the same rela-
tion to the indebtedness as that of full-owner farms. On the basis of a
survey made in 1920, the United States Bureau of Agricultural Eco-
nomics estimated that tenant farms in Minnesota were mortgaged for
11.7 per cent of their value. It has here been assumed that the ratio
of debt to value on tenant farms changed after 1920 to the same degree
as it did on owner farms. The insurance company figure is estimated
from the amount of loans outstanding on January I, 1924, it being
assumed that the rate of increase in 1924 was the same as during tire
-previous year.
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The foregoing discussion of the principal sources of farm mort-
gage loans leads to the conclusion that comparatively few farmers are
fully acquainted with the advantages of the long-term amortization type
of loan. The improvements and the farm itself are investments of
such a nature that the returns from them are spread over many years.
When interest rates are generally low, farmers are able, especially in
the older communities, to obtain local money from private sources at
a rate of interest as low as that offered by the Minnesota Rural Credit
Bureau or the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, or even lower. How-
ever, most of these local loans are for five years or less and may need
to be renewed at a time when interest rates are high, and perhaps when,
owing to money stringency, it may be difficult to borrow from new
sources. At such a time institutions are usually able to make only a
small percentage of the loans demanded. It seems reasonable to sup-
pose that if the majority of farmers had their loans on an amortization
basis, some of the hardships caused by a money stringency might be
eliminated. Even if rates are not higher when the short term loans
mature, there is in most cases a renewal expense to pay at the end of
each five years until the loan is liquidated. With the amortization loan,
there are no renewal expenses. The farmer, instead of the lender,
occupies the preferred position. If he wishes to pay off all his loan m-
any part of it in or after five years, or pay more rapidly than the con-
tract calls for, he may but can not be compelled to do so. If interest
rates have risen, he continues to pay at the old rate. If they have de-
clined, he may pay off his old loan and take out a new one.
The farmer may get application blanks on which to apply for a
state loan from the county auditor of the county in which he lives. In
the case of the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, the farmers have or-
ganized national farm loan associations in all parts of the state to handle
co-operatively the mortgage needs of its members. National farm loan
associations are fairly well distributed over the entire state, so that
some association is within the reach of every farmer (Fig. 9).
Second Mortgage Loans
The second. mortgage obligations found among the farmers in-
cluded in the Minnesota survey were provided for as follows: Com-
mercial banks, 61.5 per cent; retired farmers and relatives, 15.4 per
cent; investment companies, 7.7 per cent. No special institutions have
been developed in Minnesota or elsewhere to handle second mortgages.
The specialized first-mortgage loaning agencies are performing a splen-
did service for the man who has capital or additional credit to finance
50 per cent of the value of his land and 8o per cent of the value of
his buildings. Evidently many will remain tenants until late in life if
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they must wait until they are able to finance themselves to this extent.
As land values become stabilized and more accurate methods of farm
appraisal are worked out and used by loaning agencies, society may
safely provide means of financing tenants for a very much higher per-
centage of farm values. The risk on second mortgages is higher, and
the rate charged should be sufficient to cover the additional risk. The
same general organizations might provide the second mortgage facilities,
but the means and method of financing should be entirely separate.
Commission mortgages were formerly common in Minnesota. Be-
fore present marketing facilities for farm loans were provided, local
brokers waxed fat on commission mortgages taken from farmers as
pay for securing a market for their mortgage loans. If the rates
charged the farmers were 7 to 10 per cent, a first mortgage was often
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Fig. 9. Distribution of Agricultural Credit Corporations and National Farm Loan
Associations in Minnesota on April 1, 19/6. (Data supplied by Federal Land Bank of
St. Paul.)
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drawn and sold at 6 per cent interest, and a commission mortgage or
second mortgage payable yearly in amounts equal to from I to 4 per
cent of the face of the loan was taken as pay for the services of the
broker. The margins taken on commission mortgages tend to be less
now than before the advent of special credit institutions, and usually
the local brokers' services are paid as a cash fee, which is deducted at
the time of final settlement with the farmer. This seems to be a more
business-like way of paying for the service than the commission
mortgage.
Mortgage Interest Rates
The 1920 census contained an inquiry as to the interest rates paid
on farm mortgages by owner operators. Figure 10 gives the results
as county averages. The range is from 5.0 per cent in Carver County
to 7.1 per cent in Koochiching County. The rates are, in general,
MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES IN 1920, BY -COUNTIES
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Fig. so. The interest rates ranged from 5 per cent in Carver County to
7.1 per cent in Koochiching County. In general, rates are lowest in the counties
west and south of the Twin Cities and highest in the counties north and northwest.
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lowest in the counties west and south of the Twin Cities, and highest
in the counties north and northwest. Figure i i gives these rates and
also the rates in 1890 according to the nine districts into which the
state is divided for crop reporting purposes by the United States De-
partment of Agriculture. The decrease for the state in this 30-year
period is 2.6 per cent, ranging from 2.0 per cent in District 9 to 3.2 in
District 2. (The 1890 rate .f or District 3 could have represented only
the immediate vicinity of Duluth.) FaTm mortgage interest rates tend
MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES IN 1890 AND 1920, BY CROP
REPORTING DISTRICTS
florlyar Inlet-ad Pale
Upper ilpire 1590
Lower iigure 19Z0
Fig. ii. The average decrease in itterest rates for the state in the 30-year
period was 2.6 per cent, ranging from 2.0 per cent ix). District I to 3.2 per cent
in District II.
to be low near the larger cities. In 1890, capital for farm development
was very scarce in Minnesota. No census of interest rates was taken
between 1890 and 1920. The rate of interest charged by banks on
farm mortgages in 1920 was one per cent higher than the average rates
for farm mortgage loans from all sources. Loans from relatives, former
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owners, and retired farmers tend to be at lower rates• than loans from
local banks. Loans from public agencies have also been at lower rates
than from local banks, in many parts of the state. The banker's rates
declined about one per cent, on the average, from 1921 to 1926, the
decline ranging from 2.6 per cent in District 7 to 0.5 per cent in Dis-
trict 6 (Table XXVII). If the average rate for mortgage loans from
all sources declined in the same proportion, a census taken in 1926
would have shown a state average of 5.2 per cent. Probably other rates
declined less than banker's rates.
TABLE XXVII
INTEREST RATES ON FARM MORTGAGES IN MINNESOTA; ALL FARM MORTGAGES IN 1920;
LOCAL BANK MORTGAGES, 1921 AND 1926
Districts
1920 census
all farm
mortgages
Local bank mortgage loans
1921 1926
per cent per cent per cent
1 6.4 7.0 6.3
2 6.6 8.1 7.3
3 6.3 8.o 7.0
4 5.9 6.5 5.4
5 5.7 6.3 5.6
6 6.o 6.7 6.2
7 5.5 7.6 5.0
8 5.4 6.2 5-4
9 5.7 6.1 5.5
State 5.8 6.8 5.9
Rates in the cut-over section are surprisingly low. This is because
land companies selling cut-over land furnish most of the credit. Studies
of farms in northern Minnesota made by the Division of Agricultural
Economics in 1919 and 1920 contain reports of 296 purchases on con-
tract at an average interest rate of 6.1 per cent, and 161 purchases on
mortgages at 6.5 per cent interest. But the 'rates on farm mortgage
loans from local banks averaged 7.4 per cent. The land companies find
it easier to ask $5 or $10 extra per acre for land than to ask 7 or 8
per cent interest on mortgages-$25 to $30 an acre for used land seems
not half so unreasonable to a buyer from Illinois as 7 or 8 per bent in-
terest on a loan, and yet it amounts to about the same.
There are good reasons for assuming that the activities of the new
sources of loans have lowered the interest rate on farm mortgages.
(I) Federal land banks have standardized farm mortgages. The fed-
eral appraisers, presumably, are not influenced by local considerations.
Mortgages are deposited as security for bonds, which are instrumen-
talities of the government and for which the twelve banks are jointly
liable.13 (2) The market for mortgage bonds has been broadened.
"The government does not guarantee these bonds, but being instrumentalities of the gov-
ernment they are tax free.
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Bonds are now issued in denominations as low as $40. The bonds are
suitable investments for savings banks, and are eligible as security for
deposits of government funds. Further, the income from farm loan
bonds is exempt from federal, state, and local taxation.
There is also some statistical evidence that federal land banks have
lowered interest rates paid by farmers on mortgages. The margin be-
tween the rates charged by savings banks on first mortgage farm loans
in Minnesota and the average rates earned by ten high-grade railroad
bonds and the average rate on prime commercial paper, is less now than
before the federal land bank began operating (Fig. 12). The activity
of the federal land bank in Minnesota is probably one of the factors
affecting this change. Another factor is the decreasing risk in con-
nection with farm loans as farm communities are developed. Since
1920, the market outlets for farm loans through farm mortgage com-
panies have been demoralized. The Federal Land *Bank of St. Paul
a
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Fig. 12. Curves showing rates charged by savings banks on first mortgage farm
loans, the average rates earned by ten high grade railroad bonds, and the average rate
on prime commercial paper from 1895 to 1924.
and the Minnesota Rural Credit Bureau probably have lowered the rate
of interest that Minnesota farmers would otherwise have paid for loans
between 1920 and 1927.
The rate charged by savings banks does not tell what the farmer
had to pay for money, but rather the rate at which the broker of farm
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mortgages could sell them. If money in the community was plentiful,
the broker usually worked on a narrow margin. If not, he often
charged all the traffic would bear. Another source of gain to the
farmer from federal land banks is the savings on margins and com-
missions formerly taken by the local brokers of farm mortgages, and
the elimination of the expense of frequent -renewals. No commissions
are charged on loans made under the farm loan act and the interest
can not exceed 6 per cent. At present the interest rate charged by the
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul is 5 per cent. Farmers having loans
made when the interest rate was 5.5 and 6 per cent may liquidate them
by taking a new loan at the lower rate of interest when the old loans
have run five years.
The federal farm loan banks on January T, 1927, had $1,077,858,723
outstanding to the farmers of the United States on real estate se-
curity. Even, if the saving to the farmers in interest and commissions
is assumed to be but 0.5 per cent, which is a most conservative estimate,
this would amount to an annual saving of over 5 million dollars. If
the level of rates on loans from other sources has also been lowered,
. this will represent a vastly larger saving.
The loans in Minnesota of the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul and
of the Minnesota Rural Credit Bureau on January I, 1927, amounted
to $81,194,800. Assuming the same average saving of 0.5, these in-
stitutions are saving the farmers of Minnesota annually $406,000 just
on the money loaned by them. A saving of 0.5 per cent on the total
estimated mortgage indebtedness on Minnesota farms on January 1,
1925, would amount to an annual saving to the farmers of 2; million
dollars.
SHORT-TERM CREDIT
Short-term credit is here defined as credit for a year or less, because
a majority of the short-term loans made to farmers in Minnesota are
for a longer period than six months, the usual upper limit named for
strictly short-term loan. Such a. limit is far better suited to com-
mercial than to agricultural loans. The principal sources of such credit
are country banks, stores, and private individuals, the country bank
being by far the most important source.
In this section, short-term credit will be considered under two
heads, that secured by personal notes or chattel mortgages, called per-
sonal or collateral loans, and that provided by merchants, called mer-
cantile credit. Usually, when collateral or personal cash loans are made
the intention is to repay the principal at .the end of a period not ex-
ceeding one year. These loans are often continued by renewals for
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an indefinite time. After a period of prosperity in which farmers have
been encouraged by business men and bankers to extend their credit,
an abnormal proportion of these short-term loans become a part of the
fixed indebtedness and eventually are incorporated with the mortgage
indebtedness. Credit at mercantile establishments for mo. re than 30
days is here considered as mercantile credit.
As already explained, little information is available as to short-
term credit. What is here presented is mostly obtained from the survey
made in the six Minnesota areas in 1924.
TABLE XXVIII
COLLATERAL AND PERSONAL LOANS FROM SURVEY OF 6 MINNESOTA AREAS, 1924
County Area No. Tenants Owner-operators Both
A. Percentage Borrowing
Steele 
 
 I 40 47 40
Cottonwood  
 
 2 8; 46 72
Pope 
 
 3 40 37 38
Norman 
 
 4 47 50 49
Chisago 
 
 5 .. 44 • •
Hubbard 
 
 6 .. 45 ..
Average 61 44 49
B. Average Amount per Debtor
Steele 1 
- 
$1,488 $1,444 $1,453
Cottonwood 
 
 2 1,735 1,747 1,737
Pope 
 
 3 1,024 1,199 1,152
Norman 
 
 4 1,340 1,388 1,360
Chisago 5 •••• 1,032 ••••
Hubbard 6 •••• 389 ••••
Average 1,581 1,143 1,294
C. Average for the Class
Steele 
 
 I $ 577 $ 700 $ 670
Cottonwood 
 
 2 1,488 780 1,258
Pope 
 
 3 480 352 384
Norman 
 
 4 657 1,028 848
Chisago 5 •••• 450 ••••
Hubbard 6 •••• 575 ••••
Average 958 505 631
Sixty-one per cent of tenants and 44 per' cent of owner-operators
were using short-term credit in 1924 (Table XXVIII). A greater fre-
quency of collateral loans among tenants would be expected, especially
after a period of depression in farm prices, as tenants have no oppor-
tunity to convert credit obligations contracted in a period of prosperity
into long-term farm Mortgage loans. The average amount owed by all
farmers of the indebted class was $1,294 per person, and the aver-
age for both debtors and those not so indebted was $631. The average
amount per debtor for farm owners was $1,143 and for tenants $1,581.
Apparently, the tenants in Area 2 were the most heavily involved. The
indebtedness per farmer in the various areas is not strictly comparable,
as in the wheat region a considerable portion of the grain crop had
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been marketed and the proceeds applied to reduce indebtedness, while
in the corn and hog areas, many hogs had not been• marketed at the
time the survey was taken. A few tenants in Area I had borrowed in
order to purchase feeders, which would increase their indebtedness.
The farmers in Areas i and 4 depend less on dairying than those in
the other areas, and dairying was relatively profitable from 1921 to
1923.- The average personal cash loan for all tenants was $958, for
all owner-operators $505, and for tenants and owner-operators, $631.
TABLE XXIX
PERCENTAGE OF PERSONAL OR COLLATERAL LOANS FOR VARIOUS PURPOSES IN
 SIX
AREAS OF MINNESOTA
Steele
Purposes County,
Area i
Cottonwood
County,
Area 2
T..and 65 o
Buildings and improve-
ments 25.5 91
Equipment and ma-
chinery 
.
3.5
Livestock 3.5
Operating expenses.. 1.5 9
Miscellaneous* I
Rent IO
Equipment and ma-
chinery 45.33
Livestock 50 46
Operating expenses 7 3
Miscellaneous* 6
Pope
County,
Area 3
Owners
19
20
7
7
39
s
Tenants
5
33
33
3
26
Norman
County,
Area 4
Chisago
County,
Area 5
Hubbard
County,
Area 6
Average
for all
areas
42
0
45
29
32
24
40.0
27.0
55 so 6 7.5
• • I 5 2.0
43 SO 26 21.0
5 7 2.5
i6 - • • 5
55 • • 44
21 . . 40
7 • • • 4
5 • • • • 7
* Under miscellaneous are such items as school, sickness, bank st
ock, and automobiles.
Purpose of Short-Term Loans
In the six areas surveyed, 40 per cent of all collateral and personal
loans was for financing land purchases (Table XXIX). Two classes
of people make up the bulk of those borrowing on short-term notes
in order to purchase land: (I) The successful farmer out of debt who
wishes to buy a small adjoining tract; and (2) the farmer who is
related to the person from whom the land is bought. Such notes are
Usually renewed from year to year until paid. Loans for buildings and
other improvements come next and then operating expenses. One of
the items frequently mentioned under operating expenses is labor for
seasonal work. Farmers complained that the wages they were com-
pelled to pay to harvest the crop at the right time were too high when
compared with the selling price of the crop. The fact that some ten-
ants were compelled to borrow money with which to pay their rent
may suggest that some rents were still too high for the prevailing farm
price level. It may have been due to dependence mostly upon one crop,
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which failed. Most of the tenants owed considerably more on their
livestock, machinery, and equipment than the owners and were not
far along the road to ownership. Tenants ordinarily borrowed more
for living expenses than owners, many having stalled the year without
reserves.
Security
Table XXX indicates that bankers and others who loan money to
farmers for short and intermediate periods are not too particular about
security. When 70 per cent of the owners and 38 per "cent of the
tenants can borrow money without pledging any definite property in
payment of the debt, they enjoy a very high credit rating. The forms
of security required in Minnesota are limited. The practice of having
a neighbor sign a note with the borrower was generally unpopular.
Usually, either a plain note is accepted or a note secured by a chattel
mortgage on livestock, machinery, or other equipment. The consensus
of opinion among bankers interviewed seemed to be that losses had been
considerably less from small unsecured loans than from large secured
loans. More information is needed as to the cost of the risk on loans
to various classes of farmers and in different systems of farming. It
may be socially desirable to underwrite such risks by adding the cost
to the interest rate. If so, it would be necessary to spread the cost
over a wide territory. Careful investigation in this field might lead to
social and economic gains and increase individual opportunities.
TABLE XXX
SECURITY FOR PERSONAL OR COLLATERAL LOANS, 1924 SURVEY
Form Owners Tenants
• Farmer's note 
...
70 38
Chattel security  • 28 54
Plain note plus one signer • I 4
Plain note plus two signers 
Need for Better Bank Loan Practices
Generally, the country banks of Minnesota have taken pride in as-
sisting the farmers to promote their, business. During the period of
rising prices, from 1897 to 1920, bankers generally were assiduous in
fostering cordial relationships with the farmers.. This is desirable. But
people who find themselves beginning to prosper often borrow or buy
on credit too freely for their own good. Bankers should be better in-
formed on the agricultural situation. Many bankers make loans to
farmers in order that they may plant more wheat or buy more cows
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or sheep, when a knowledge of production trends and price levels would
dictate exactly the opposite policy.
A better business relationship would be developed if bankers would
compel each farmer to make a financial statement before loaning to
him; and if they would more carefully analyze the purposes for which
he wishes to borrow. The financial statements now required by the
federal reserve banks and the intermediate credit banks before farm
paper will be discounted, are satisfactory and should be used by all
country banks. The old system, under which the banker took a pleasant
drive through the country during the summer, getting a bird's-eye view
of the farms and the condition of the crops and livestock, and then
loaned liberally the balance of the season, if conditions looked good to
him, must give way to risk analysis as a basis for sound investment.
Period of Collateral or Personal Loans
More than half of the collateral and personal loans to both farm
owners and tenants in these areas were drawn for from nine months
to a year. Only 25 and 31 per cent, respectively, were due in six
months, and only 7 and one per cent, respectively, in less than 90 days
(Table XXXI). Such loans are often too large to be paid from cur-
rent earnings. A survey of country banks would probably show that
the conventional banking theory that country banks can not safely make
loans to farmers for more than six months does not conform to practice.
Bankers are more interested in having ample assets back of their loans
than they are in having all their loans paid at maturity. In a panic
period, however, when deposits are declining, the effect of having a
considerable portion of the bank's assets in comparatively long-term
paper is often a shortage of funds for meeting the demand of current
loans. Bankers are prone to forget this in prosperous times. Since
the federal reserve system has been created, loans having sufficient
security that they can be rediscounted may be of more importance than
the length of time for which the loan is made. The country bankers'
problem of a money reserve has been greatly simplified since the federal
reserve banks began mobilizing the liquid reserves of the country.
Dairying and diversified farming in Minnesota have further simplified
the short-term credit problem for both the farmer and the banker.
Further diversification will help still more. Where there is a steady flow
of income as distinguished from the "after harvest" settlement, as with
the general grain farmer, it ought to be feasible to operate .short-term
loans on the basis of from three to six months.
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TABLE XXXI
PERIOD OF COLLATERAL AND PERSONAL LOANS IN SIX AREAS SURVEYED
57
Period
Owners, Tenant-,
per cent per cent
6o days or less 
90 days  6
6 months   25 31
9. months to a year  54 57
More than a year 5
Indefinite  9 I I
Mercantile Credit
Few Minnesota farmers use much store credit. The practice of
merchants "grub staking" the farmers during the planting, harvesting,
and marketing of the annual crop seems to be rapidly disappearing.
Only 13 per cent of the owner operators and 17 per cent of the tenants
were using such credit (Table XXXII). In North Carolina, Georgia,
and Tennessee, where farmers generally can not obtain funds from
banks, mercantile credit is used very extensively. Surveys in Georgia
in 1923 found ioo per cent of the farm owners using mercantile credit
and from 30 to 50 per cent of owners and tenants combined.14 The
relative volume of mercantile credit in Minnesota is less than one per
cent of the total farm debt, being a matter of convenience rather than
another method of borrowing. Mercantile credit is used to a greater
extent in new sections of the state and in one-crop sections than in
the older and diversified sections. In a few instances farmers were
getting 5 per cent discount for cash. There seems to be a slight tendency
in this direction.
TABLE XXXII
AMOUNT OF MERCANTILE CREDIT IN SIX AREAS SURVEYED
County . Area
Owners Tenants
Percentage Amount
using such per
credit borrower
Percentage Amount
using such per
credit borrower
Stee'e 
Cottonwood 
I
2
so
7
$296
150
30
18
$1o6
234
Pope 3 o o SO 20
Norman 4 20 242 SO 350
Chisagp 5. 23 170 • • •
Hubbard 6 15 120 • • •
Average All 53 $189 17 $169
The rate of interest on mercantile credit is rather indefinite. If
interest was charged, it was usually 8 per. cent. Many farmers were
carried Without interest for a few months by ha'rdware dealers, lumber
Farm Credit, Farm Tenancy, and Farm Taxation, by Nils A. Olsen, C. 0. Brannen,
G. F. Cadish, and R. W. Newton, U.S. Dept. Agr. Yearbook, p. 229.
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dealers, general merchandise dealers, and doctors. Merchants of the
South often charge tenants from 30 to 40 per cent for credit, and the
average rate charged in North Carolina in 1922 was 26 per cent.15
Mercantile credit is usually carried as an open account, and except in
the case of farm machinery, where a conditional sales contract is often
used, no particular security is pledged. Crop liens are practically un-
known in connection with mercantile credit in Minnesota.
The high concentration of the use made of mercantile credit, as
•shown in Table XXXIII, is significant. Fifty per cent of mercanti:e
credit extended to farm owners is used for rather durable additions to
the farm capital—building material and machinery. Tenants still have
the hardware stores to aid them in obtaining the machinery necessary
to operate their farms. Of their mercantile credit, 71 per cent was
for hardware and implements;
TABLE XXXIII
PURPOSES SERVED BY MERCHANT CREDIT IN S.IX AREAS STUDIED
Owner-Operators Per cent
Implements and hardware  31
Food and clothing  61
Minding material  19
Miscellaneous  4
Tenants
Implements and hardware  71
Garage bills  26
Miscellaneous  3
Fewer of either owners or tenants were using the merchant as a
source of credit than we have been accustomed to expect. This indi-
cates that the practice of paying cash for groceries and supplies is be-
coming common. Only one owner operator out of eight and one tenant
out of six were using store credit. Several farmers and merchants
said that the use of credit for buying feed and supplies declined rapidly
after 1920, principally because:
1. Credit extended by wholesale houses to merchants was restricted
after 1920, compelling the merchant, in turn, to restrict the amount of
credit extended to farmers.
2. Competition of cash-and-carry stores and of mail-order houses
has compelled more merchants to mark their goods on a cash-sale basis.
3. As farmers generally milk a few cows, they are able, like their
city friends who receive a regular income, to pay their bills at the end
of each month. In many cases, however, the farmer pays every two
weeks, as the cream checks are received.
15 Farm Credit in North Carolina, by Fred R. Yoder, H. S. Beachley, and A. J.
 Honey-
cutt, Bull. North Carolina Dept. of Agr., p. 24, Raleigh.
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To farmers who are buying lumber, machinery, and supplies on
credit, the suggestion is made that it probably would be better to dis-
continue this practice and make a greater use of banks. Merchants
who sell for cash should be able to sell more cheaply than those who
extend credit freely. Experience has proved that mercantile credit is
more expensive than bank credit. The advice is not to use more credit,
but to purchase credit where it is the cheapest.
Interest Rates on Short-Term Credit
The latest published information on rates of interest on short-term
loans in Minnesota is for 1916.16 In Figure 13, interest rates in 1916
are summarized by crop reporting districts. The rates ranged from
Norl Tirm _Interest Palea
Upper f;_iiiure-R. Rafe
Lower igere-
Fig. 13. Short-Term Interest Rates in Minnesota by Crop Reporting Districts, 1916
6.9 per cent in District 9 to 11:4 per cent in District 2. They average
about 2.5 per cent higher than the interest. rates on farm mortgages
16 Factors Affecting Interest Rates and Other Charges on Short-Time Loans, by C. R.
Thompson, U.S. Dept. Agr. Bull. 409, P. 4. Rates quoted are the average total cost of loans
including discounts, bonuses, and other extra charges, as reported -by correspondents.
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in 1920. The difference is in about the same proportion in the various
districts except Districts i and 2, where the mortgage loans average
3.2 .per cent higher, while in District 9, in the southern part of the
state, the spread is only one per cent. As already explained, mortgage
rates are surprisingly low in the cut-over region because land companies
furnish so much of the credit. The comparison really should be with
the bankers' rates on farm mortgages, which were probably about 6.6
per cent in 1920. Scarcity of capital is no doubt a factor in the higher
rate in some parts of the state, but more important factors are the
greater risks associated with loans in small-grain and new regions, and
the higher unit costs of operating the smaller banks found in some
of these areas. Rates also tend to be higher on small loans.
TABLE XXXIV
PERCENTAGE OF SHORT-TERM LOANS MADE AT THE VARIOUS RATES OF INTEREST; 1924 SURVEY
County
Interest rates to owners, per cent Rates to tenants, per cent
4 5 5% 6 7 7rZ 8 5 • 6 8 I0
Steele 
'Cottonwood 
Pope 
Norman 
•Chisago 
Hubbard 
•
•
•
Borrowed from Banks
• • • • • • Ioo • • Ioo
20 8o • • 6 94
• • • • • • Ioo • • Too
8 8 84 • • • Too
• • 47 7 46
• •
100
Borrowed from Private Individuals
'Steele  14 15 71 • • • • • •
'Cottonwood 
Tope 
Norman 
.Chisago  Ioo
Hubbard ...... Ioo
_ Steele  75 25
Cottonwood Too
Pope 
Norman  ioo Ioo
Chisago  Ioo
Hubbard 
•• • •
• • • •
Borrowed from Relatives
• •
TOO
100
 • • • • • • •
• •
• • • • • • • •
. . • 001
All other sources at 8 per cent except one loan at PA per cent.
The most recent data available on short-term interest rates in various
*sections of Minnesota are those obtained in the 1924 survey. The rates
reported by the borrowers were lowest from relatives, highest from
banks, and between the two from private individuals (Table XXXIV).
The data show a general tendency for banks in all parts of the state
to charge local farmers the maximum legal rate of inte'rest.17 One
reason for this is that since 1920 country banking has not been profitable.
All bankers agree that higher rates are needed. In Steele, Pope, and
17 The legislature of 1923 changed the maximum legal rate from io to 8 per cent.
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Hubbard Counties, all owner-farmers interviewed said they were pay-
ing 8 per cent interest; likewise the tenants in Steele, Pope, and
Norman Counties. Only 6 per cent of the tenants in Cottonwood
County enjoyed a bank rate of less than 8 per cent. For all areas
combined, the owners were paying interest at the following rates:
85.0 per cent we're paying 8.o per cent.
792.5 7-5
7-8
4-7
77 9/
77 77
7.0
6.o
77 9/
77 79
/7 7/
The interest rate on the bulk of the loans to owners from private
parties and from relatives was from 4 to 5 per cent; to tenants, more
often 5 and 6 per cent. Since 1924, there probably has been some re-
duction in interest rates, especially in the southern counties. Banks are
being consolidated and in some cases liquidated. On January I , 1926,
there were 302 fewer banks in Minnesota than on January I, 1920.
Unless a local monopoly rate prevails, rates on short-term notes may
be expected to decline somewhat from the level of 1924.
Short-Term Credit in Cut-Over Areas
The special study made of settlement conditions in northern Minne-
sota and the neighboring cut-over area in 1919 and 1920 brought out
important facts relative to short-term loans. Settlers have important
needs for credif, such as lumber and building materials, horses, dynamite
for clearing land, and farming equipment. They need credit for
groceries, feed, and other supplies, when they have little income (Table
XXXV). The majority of these loans were obtained on notes and
chattel mortgages, but some were obtained on real estate moTtgages.
No federal land bank loans are included in this tabulation. The aver-
age interest rate for short-term loans was 7.7 per Cent; for real estate
mortgages, 6.5 per cent.
TABLE XXXV
PURPOSES OF 633 LOANS OBTAINED BY SETTLERS IN MINNESOTA AND MICHIGAN, SUBSEQUENT
TO FIRST PURCHASE OF LAND
Purpose of loans Loans
Average interest
rate,* per cent
Buy stock 157 7.6
Buy more land 46 6.4
Pay off land debt 205 6.7
Building 103 6.5
Living expenses 38 8.4
Feed 27 8.1
Clearing 17 8.1
Machinery 6.6
Miscellaneous 37 7.6
All sources 633 7.2t
* Not including rates on federal farm loans. .
t Real estate mortgages, 6.5 per cent; short-time loans, 7.7 per cent.
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Interest rates on loans were higher in northern Minnesota than in
northern Michigan, the average for Minnesota alone being 8.6 per
cent on note-secured loans and 9.3 per cent on chattel mortgage loans,
or 8.7 per cent on both combined. On note-secured loans• from banks
alone, the average rate in Minnesota alone was 8.9 per cent, ranging
from 8.2 per cent in one area to 9.7 per cent in another. The average
rate on all short-term loans in the cut-over regions of the Upper
Peninsula of Michigan and of Wisconsin were about 7.6 per cent, and
in the cut-over region of Lower Michigan they were still lower.
Several land companies in 192o and 1921 were providing consid-
erable short-term credit for settlers on the basis of either chattel mort-
gages or clauses in contracts that allow them to add the amount of
such loans to the purchase price of the land. The land company most
liberal in this respect was advancing funds for buildings, livestock,
machinery, dynamite, and living expenses for the settlers N'vhile they
were clearing the land, and machine and horse labor at land clearing.
The -settlers on this project had increased their debts an average of
$874 during the first two years after settlement, but they had cleared
over io acres of land and added $900 to their building, livestock, and
equipment inventory.18
INTERMEDIATE CREDIT
Intermediate credit is commonly defined as credit for periods of
from six months to three years. As notes commonly run for more
than six months and real- estate mortgages are sometimes made for
less than three years, there is some overlapping of sources of short-
term, intermediate, and long-term credit. Direct sources of intermediate
credit to the farmer are individuals, savings banks, trust companies,
country banks, co-operative credit associations, agricultural credit cor-
porations, cattle loan companies, trade and mercantile institutions, and
co-operative marketing associations.1° The secondary sources through
which the primary sources rediscount are individuals who buy such
paper from banks for investments, intermediate credit banks, and federal
reserve banks.2° The intermediate credit banks may in turn sell their
debentures to federal reserve banks, insurance companies, various kinds
of banks and trust companies, and individuals.
is Settlement and Colonization in the Great Lakes States, by J. D. Black and L. C. Gray,
U.S. Dept. Agr. Bull. 1295, p. 73. 1925.
i9 Farmers get a considerable amount of intermediate credit from the country banks through
the process of renewing their notes. The principal sources of intermediate credit in Minnesota
are trade and mercantile companies and banks.
213 The agricultural credit act of 1923 amended the federal reserve act to permit the
federal reserve bank to rediscount farm paper frcm member banks for a period up to nine
months.
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Until 1923 there were no special governmental institutions organized
to supply the farm credit needs of the intermediate type. After the
break in prices in 1920 and 1921, many farmers found it impossible to
pay their debts td the banks, and with declining deposits the banks, in
turn, were hard pressed. Many econoniists, farm leaders, and bankers
were of the opinion that banks organized primarily to supply industry
and trade were not in position to supply farmers' intermediate credit
needs. It was said that commercial banks must keep their funds in-
vested in short-term paper in order to be able to repay depositors on
short notice. On June 7, 1921, Congress provided for a Joint Commis-
sion of Agricultural Inquiry. In its report this commission said: "The
Commission believes that the difficulties of agriculture are in part due
to the credit restrictions and limitations of the past 18 months, and in
*part are due to the. fact that the banking machinery of the country is
not adequately adapted to the farmers' requirements."21 In 1923 Con-
gress provided for twelve intermediate credit banks. One such bank
serves each federal land bank district and is located in the same city
as the district federal land bank. The bank serving this district is
located in St. Paul and has the same officers as the land bank except
that a special officer is manager. The position of the intermediate credit
banks in financing agriculture has been said to be similar to that of
federal reserve banks in financing commercial and industrial enterprises.
Such a statement can be made because the farmers of the country never
really understood that federal reserve banks were established to help
them as well as trade and industry. They did not appreciate the federal
reserve banks because most rural banks did not and do not now belong
to the system.
A farmer can not borrow directly from intermediate credit banks.
He must borrow through co-operative marketing associations, agricul-
tural credit corporations, livestock loan associatipns, or local banks. If
loans were to be made direct to farmers, cumbersome machinery would
be needed. As it is, the farmer must learn to help himself through his
own co-operative organizations or through agricultural credit corpora-
tions if he is not well served by his local bank. The direct loans to
farmers' co-operative associations are made only on the basis of agricul-
tural commodities, and the loans are secured by warehouse receipts. The
federal farm loan board has approved the following commodities, when
properly stored, as acceptable for security on warehouse receipts: Grain,
cotton, wool, tobacco, beans, rice, alfalfa, red-top and clover seed, hay,
nuts, dried fruits, maple syrup, honey, broom corn, and cannel fruits
.Report of the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, Part II, p. 7.
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and vegetables.22 The board may add other commodities to the list
when it has determined whether they can be stored so that warehouse
receipts based on them will make good collateral. Potatoes, an im-
portant product in Minnesota, handled to some extent by co-operatives,
do not appear in the list of approved commodities.
Volume of Business of Intermediate Credit Banks
The amount of direct loans to co-operative marketing associations
and the commodities loaned upon by the twelve intermediate credit banks
at the close of business December 31, 1927, are given in Appendix
Table 2. Co-operative marketing associations in the St. Paul district,
which serve Minnesota, North Dakota, Wisconsin, and Michigan, were
using this source of credit to the extent of $847,848. In the Springfield,
Omaha, and Spokane intermediate credit districts,. co-operatives were
borrowing still less. Districts in which tobacco, cotton, and raisins
were marketed co-operatively had the largest borrowers. Co-operatives
in the Berkeley district borrowed nearly 6 million dollars on raisins
alone.
The most valuable field of service for the intermediate credit banks
has been in financing co-operative marketing organizations. On
December 31, 1927, the direct loans to co-operative marketing associa-
tions in the United States totaled $31,990,597. The service to co-
operatives has been particularly valuable in the South and West. On
December 31, 1927, loans to co-operatives in the intermediate credit
districts surrounding New Orleans, Berkeley, and Wichita ranged from
4 to 6 million dollars. They were about half as large in the Baltimore
and Columbia districts; between one and 2 millions in the Louisville,
Houston, and St. Louis districts; and less than one million in the St. Paul,
Springfield, Spokane, and Omaha districts.
On April 7, 1928, the Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Paul re-
discounted notes for banks, agricultural credit corporations, and live-
stock loan companies to the extent of $7,550,013 (Table XXXVI). On
December 31, 1925, these three institutions were rediscounting only
$3,040,847, and on December 31, 1926, $4,440,464. This represents a
rapid expansion of business. This increased demand for loans has come
largely through the agricultural credit corporations and almost none of
it through the banks. A partial explanation for this is the acute psycho-
logical conditions surrounding solvent banks. In communities where
one or more banks have failed, the solvent banks have frequently deemed
it necessary to invest their surplus funds in paper having a daily market
in order to protect themselves against possible "withdrawal runs."
22 Federal Farm Loan Board, Circular 15, p. 18. 1925.
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The Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Paul has financed the North
Dakota Wheat Growers' Association and the Northern Wisconsin Co-
operative Tobacco Pool for the crop seasons of 1923 to 1927. It has
financed the Door County Fruit Growers' Union of Sturgeon Bay,
Wisconsin, during the crop seasons from 1924 to 1927 and expects to
finance the 1928 crop. It also has financed the North Dakota Co-op-
erative Wool Marketing Association on the 1925, 1926, and 1927 clip.
Intermediate credit has not been available to potato co-operatives. Co-
operative butter marketing organizations have not needed credit of the
intermediate type. There is a possibility of cheese being favorably
passed upon as a suitable product for warehouse 'receipt loans, and if
it is, the Wisconsin cheese producers will undoubtedly make some use
of such credit.
TABLE XXXVI
REDISCOUNTS AND DIRECT LOANS OF INTERMEDIATE CREDIT BANKS AT CLOSE OF BUSINESS,
APRIL 7, 1928'
District
Rediscountst Direct loans
Agricultural Livestock Co-operative
State credit loan marketing
banks corporations companies associations
Springfield  $ 667,927
Baltimore $203,512 1,907,733 $ 1,696,301
. Columbia 38,787
,
6,165,573 890,000
Louisville 41,613 211,646 1,395,768
New Orleans  5,731,578 $ 145,318 4,090,004
St. Louis 32,434 557,118 672,928 767,451
St. Paul 52,165 7,497,848 579,172
Omaha • 5,576,941 344,041
Wichita 42,506 217,833 501,178 4,264,659
Houston 1,268 673,620 6,856,196 1,500,000
Berkeley 3,174,965 5,545,297 6,864,476
Spokane 2,856,24! 2,573,141 371,604
Total  $412,286 829,604,084 , $21,870,999 $22,763,476
" Data from monthly statement of Federal Farm Loan Board.
f National banks were rediscounting $7,900 with the Springfield bank. Savings banks
and Trust. companies, Houston, $20,000.
Various reasons have been advanced as to why greater use has not
been made of the intermediate credit banks. One reason is that the
individual farmer has found it difficult to establish relations with his
district bank, as he can not borrow directly. Local banks, unless hard
pressed, are inclined not to rediscount in order to extend the volume
of their loans. Further, until March, 1927, banks were not permitted
to charge an interest rate of more than iY2 per cent above the inter-
mediate rediscount rate on rediscounted paper. In March, 1927, the
margin allowed was increased to 272 per cent. There is no limitation
as to the margin taken by the local bank if its paper is rediscounted with
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the federal reserve banks and the rediscount rate .from the latter has
been below that of the intermediate credit banks. Furthermore, the law
limits the volume of rediscounts that a bank may have with intermediate
credit banks to 21/2 times its capital and surplus, while there is no such
legal limit in rediscounting either with federal reserve banks or with
city correspondent banks..
On January 1, 1927, there were 51 agricultural credit corporations
in North Dakota, 7 in Wisconsin, and 18 in Minnesota. Two new credit
corporations were organized in. Minnesota during the last half of 1926
and three were discontinued. The location of the corporations in Min-
nesota on April 1, 1926, is shown in Figure 9. Following is a list:
Agricultural Credit Corporations—Minnesota
Farmers Credit Company, Claremont, Minn. .
Otter Tail Loan & Investment Company, Fergus Falls, Minn.
Farmers Credit Company, Goodridge, Minn.
Greenbush Credit Company, Greenbush, Minn.
National Credit Company, Herman, Minn.
Farmers Credit Company, Kennedy, Minn.
Lake Park Cattle Loan Company, Lake Park, Minn.
Bankers Dairy Credit Corporation, Minneapolis, Minn.
Montevideo Agricultural Credit Company, Montevideo, Minn.
Farmers Credit Company, Oslo, Minn.
Farmers Credit Company, Redwood Falls, Minn.
Northwestern Agricultural Credit Corporation, St. Cloud, Minn.
Farmers Credit Company, -Stephen, Minn.
Farmers Credit Company, Tyler, Minn.
Walnut Grove Credit Company, Walnut Grove, Minn.
Mahnomen County Cattle & Credit Company, Waubun, Minn.
Faribault County Credit Company, Wells, Minn.
Northwest Farmers Credit Association, Pipestone, Minn.
Indications are that the agricultural credit corporations in Minne-
sota will form the chief connecting link between the farmer and the
Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Paul. These institutions are organized
under the state general incorporation law.23 Shortly after Congress
provided for the intermediate credit bank system a number of banks
in Minnesota organized small agricultural Credit corporations with a
minimum capital of $ o,000. Following good banking standards, the
management of the bank in St. Paul refused to rediscount all poorly
secured paper. Its acceptance of well secured paper has given a much
needed service to many banks. Many of these early corporations had
either liquidated or were inactive by the beginning of 1927. As, theo-
retically, the intermediate credit banks are not to compete with local
banks, the advisability of establishing a large number of small organiza-
23 The Minnesota legislature passed a special incorporation law intended for them during
1923-24 session, but because cf restrictive features on loans, it has not been used.
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tions may be questioned. A few large organizations are now reaching
out over a large territory for loans, notably those in Minneapolis and
Pipestone. There will probably soon be enough large agricultural credit
corporations that their service in connecting the individual borrower
with the Intermedite Credit Bank of St. Paul will be available to any
farmer in Minnesota. A mere statement of the problem is sufficient
to show that there are many unsolved problems in connection with the
operation of such contact institutions.
The following extracts from letters indicate some of the services
that may be rendered by the intermediate credit bank, through agricul-
tural credit corporations:
From Mahnomen County Cattle Credit Company, March 30, 1926—
"Most of the money we are loaning through - our Association is for
milk cows, steers, sheep, and hogs. We have found the Federal Interme-
diate Credit Bank of St. Paul very liberal on loans that are used to buy
livestock.
"Last year we shipped in iwo or three carloads of cows and steers
together with two carloads of sheep. These proved to be very profitable
to the farmers. We are planning on shipping in some more steers this
spring, as last year the farmers made on the average $30 per head." •
From the Lake Park Cattle Loan Company, March 31, 1926—
"In reference to the method of operation of the Lake Park Cattle Loan
Company, I wish to say that it is organized primarily for the purpose of
lending money to farmers to carry on their farming operations by redis-
counting such notes as it may become possessed of with the Federal Inter-
mediate Credit Bank of St. Paul. These loans are proving very popular
in this locality, as they provide the farmer with a, reasonable amount of
capital on easy terms. The rate of interest after April I will be 6% per
cent to the borrower, with loans made for from 9 months to a year with
the privilege of renewal."
From Farmers Credit Company of Oslo, April 2, 1926-
"Your favor of March 27 to the Farmers Credit Co. is received.
. . . . The principal aim of our association is to make short-term loans
and in that way be able to liquidate bank indebtedness. In this way it has
worked out fine."
Agricultural credit corporations will probably increase in importance,.
but the system is too young for any prediction as to its future develop-
ment. Livestock loan companies are finding intermediate credit banks
a helpful source of credit for livestock production, as credit is needed
for a considerable time. State and national banks are rediscounting in
only a limited way. As agricultural credit corporations become more
generally available, as cattle loan companies are organized, and as co-
operative marketing associations become more efficient in grading, pro-
cessing, and warehousing, the importance of the specialized intermediate
credit agencies will probably increase.
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THE PROBLEM OF THE LOCAL BANK
By far the most important part of our whole agricultural credit
system is the commercial bank. As an agency for supplying credit and.
other needs of agriculturists, it has been rapidly expanding in impor-
tance. The increase in banking resources in Minnesota from 1900
to 1925 was 735 per cent when expressed in current dollars, and 328
per cent if expressed in dollars of 1913. Per capita bank deposits
have increased greatly in every county in Minnesota (Fig. 14). The
banking power increased relatively more rapidly in the middle west
than in other sections of the country from 1900 to 1924 (Table
XXXVIII). The eastern states lost 12 per cent in relative banking
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Fig. 14. Bank deposits per capita increased in every county in Minnesota between
1912 and 1920.
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power during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and the Middle
West gained 16 per cent.
TABLE XXXV11
GROWTH OF BANK RESOURCES IN MINNESOTA FROM 1900 TO 1925
Date
Bank Index number, Index number,
resources, wholesale dollars of
millions* pricest 1913
June 30, 1900 
 $ 141.3 82.0 172.3
June 30, 1925 1,179.9 159.0 737.8
* Report of comptroller of currency, 1925, P. 94.
t All-commodity index number, U. S. Bureau of Labor.
The rapid growth of the banking habit in the United States in the
last century is partly responsible for the growth of banks. The custom
of using checks instead of cash in the settlement of money obligations
is now widespread. The usual estimates are that at least 8o per cent
of all payments are made by check. Checks are thus more impor-
tant as a circulating medium in the United States than gold, silver,
or currency. This change has enhanced the importance of bank de-
posits and of bank credit in the economy of the nation, and has made
the regulation and supervision of the banking system a matter of greater
importance and consequence to the welfare of the people.
TABLE XXXVIII
CHANGE IN GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF BANK RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES
FROM 1900 TO 1924
Percentage of resources of all banks* Percent-
age of
1900 1924 change
East 66 54 -12
South 4 8 4
Middle West 8 24 16
Pacific Coast 4 7 3%.
* U.S. Dept. Agr. Yearbook, 1924, p. 194.
Banks Have Not Stood the Test
Yet in spite of this growth and great importance, the local banks
have not stood the test in the financial upheaval through which we have
just passed. Since 1919, 291 state banks and 65 national banks have
failed, as compared with only 67 state banks and 6 national banks in
the twenty-five years between 1894 and 1919 (Table XXXIX). Soon
after the depression began, in June, 1920, state banks that had been bor-
rowing heavily during prosperity began to fail. One bank was closed
in 1920, but was reopened in about a month. The next year, 19 banks
were closed, but 13 were later reopened. In 1922, only 15 banks were
closed, and 8 reopened. Many people thought the worst was over; but
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then came 1923, with 43 banks closing and only 16 reopening later;
then 1924 with 46 closing and only 14 reopening; 1925 with 36 closing
and 3 reopening; 1926 with 78 closing and 4 reopening; and 1927 with
53 closing.
TABLE XXXIX
BANK FAILURES IN MINNESOTA, 1894-1927*
Year ended
Aug. 31
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
Tune 30
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
5905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
Dec. 31
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
192, 
1925
1926
1927
Total
State banks, savings banks,
and trust companies National banks
No. of failures No. of banks No. of banks No. of failures
2
5
6
7
2
2
216
232
218
205
204
236
252
275
79
79
76
71
70
69
76
92
3
307 117
350 171
53 386 213
3 456 224
I 486 237
2 602 245
I 639 262
I 641 268
645 270
725 272
4 759 272
803 271
1 835 273 /
925 277
I 1,014 281
1,105 287
2 1,148 294 1
14 1,148 305
I 1,184 331
19 1,195 341t
15 1,175 330
43 1,159 344 3
46 1,088 334 8
36 1,057 318 1 1
78 956 287 30
  
53 882 285 13
  3=8 71
* National bank data to 1921, from report of comptroller of currency for 1920.
Remaining data from annual reports of the comptroller. State bank failures up to 1918 from
report of the comptroller of the currency for 1920 and from 1918 to 1927 from data furnished
by the State Banking Department.
t As of September 6, 1921.
While this large number of failures is a result of the depression,
nevertheless it shows weaknesses in the system. The banking system
must meet the needs of depression as well as of prosperity. When
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from 46 to 78 state banks in one state fail in one year, the evidence
of weaknesses in the groundwork of the system is conclusive. It is
significant that the failures did not assume large proportions until four
years after the depression, when ample credit was available for liquidat-
ing good but slow loans.
That Minnesota has been in the same plight as other states in the
Northwest is shown by Table XL. For the seven-year period ending
June 30, 1926, 316 banks failed in North Dakota, 239 in South Dakota,
183 in Montana, 34 in Wisconsin, and 212 in Iowa. In all states ex-
cept Wisconsin, the percentage of state banks failing has been consider-
ably higher than that of national banks. Wisconsin probably had, prior
to 1920, more effective bank control laws than had many neighboring
states. So far as banking laws and regulations have anything to do
with bank failures, it would be the rules and regulations effective in the
years just prior to 1920 that would have any bearing on failures follow-
ing 1920. The statement that Wisconsin's rules and regulations were,
prior to 1920, probably superior to those of the other states would require
considerable investigation in order that one could be sure of his basic
facts. The statempit, however, is suggested by the fact that Wisconsin
banking laws show that at least as early as 1915 the banking department
strictly controlled the establishment of new banks.
The mere fact that a majority of banks in the chief agricultural
states did not fail is evidence that it is possible to have such a banking
system that an abnormal number of failures red not occur during severe
depressions.
TABLE XL
BANK CLOSURES IN NORTHWEST STATES, 1920-26*
North Dakota
Year
South Dakota Montana Wisconsin Iowa •
June 30' State Nat'l State Nat'l State Nat'l State Nat'l State Nat'l Private
1920 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
1921 51 3 I 10 3 0 o 2 2 4
1922 12 2 5 0 II 7 I 0 6 o o
1923 19 3 7 5 29 12 3 I 3 2 3
1924 127 20 117 7 6
2:
II 2 17 2 8
1925 31 6 31 8 5 7 6 2 52 7 9
1926 36 4 49 7 5 7 8 o 63 i6 13
Total.... 278 38 211 28 124 59 29 5 143 30 39
Percentage
closedt 38.9 21.0 37.7 20.6 48.1 20.6 3.6 3.3 36.7 8.3 66.1
* Report of comptroller of the currency, 1920-26. .
t Based on number of banks in 1920, as shown by comptroller's report.
Why Banks Have Failed
The first approach to the reasons for bank failures is to examine the
reasons given by .the State Banking Department for closing the banks.
Associated with frozen assets as causes of particular closures, were mis-
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management, depleted reserves, criminal irregularities, worthless paper,
and too much real estate; with depleted reserves were associated mis-
management, insufficient business, too large loans, and criminal irreg-
ularities ; with excess loans were associated depleted reserves and too
many second mortgages. These causes might readily be reduced to
two—criminal irregularities and mismanagement. The first is not im-
portant. Frozen assets, depleted reserves, and excess loans appear most
frequently as evidence of mismanagement.
As 15 of the 34 banks with depleted reserves re-opened, it appears
that greater effort on the part of the officers of some of the banks in
attempting to increase reserves by rediscounting would have kept these
banks from being closed. The three banks closed because of excess
loans all reopened.
Many of the banks that have failed since 1920 are still in the process
of liquidation. The policy of the liquidation department is not to rush
the sale of assets where there is a fair possibility of saving the de-
positors' money by waiting. The liquidation department deserves credit
for keeping the costs of liquidation low. A man is left in charge of
the closed bank only as long as he is producing economical results in
the way of collections. Slow items are left to be collected by local
agencies.
TABLE XLI
REASONS FOR STATE BANK CLOSURES, 1920 TO MARCH 18, 1926*
Cause of closure No. closed No. reopened
Criminal irregularities  7 o
"Frozen assets"  108 32
Depleted reserves  34 15
Excess loans  3 3
Too much accommodation palier and one-man bank  2 o
Worthless loans  2 o
Mismanagement and irregularities  4 I
Foreign paper  9 5
Too much real estate  I o
Failure of correspondent bank  I 0
Run on account of North Dakota paper 0
Bankruptcy of president  1 o
Run on bank  2 o
Too many unsecured loans  I o
Local quarrel  I o
-
Total  177 56
* As given by A. W. Smith, examiner in charge of liquidation for the closures of Minne-
sota state banks.
A closer approach to the problem may be obtained from a letter sent
out in September, 1924, by A. J. Veigel, state superintendent of banks.
This letter undoubtedly sums up Mr. Veigel's conclusions as to the
causes of bank failures and losses* in other banks as he has found them
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in recent years. The principal causes he mentions are the following:
1. Excessive loans to officers. The department insists that this class
of loans be reduced or eliminated. "What we need is bankers without
other interests to take up their time and money."
2. Large and excessive loans. "If the note pouch contains small
and diversified loans, the total losses are usually much smaller than if
the average loan is large." The legal limit of loan to any one individual
or firm is 15 per cent of the capital and actual surplus (Ch. 103, Sess.
Laws, 1919). "If the surplus, as shown on the books, is impaired, only
the unimpaired surplus can be used in figuring excessive loans."
3. Outside paper. This means loans to individuals or corporations
not in the immediate territory of the bank. "Usually the bank's officials
know little if anything about such paper, and are obliged to take the
word of somebody else that it is good. Somebody often gets a com-
mission on such paper and the rate of interest is usually high."
4. Exchange of paper, meaning the exchange of paper between
banks with the written or oral agreement to take it back if not paid
when due.
5. Other real estate and second mortgages. Banks should not hold
large amounts of real estate, and "second mortgages should not be taken
except to secure previous debts."
6. Too many banks. "Our department is encouraging and even
urging certain banks to consolidate, where conditions warrant such
action."
7. Too small minimum capital. "We believe that the minimum
capital of banks, which is now $10,000 to $25,000, according to the
size of the city, should be increased. That would add a margin of
safety for depositors, to which they are entitled."
8. Too much borrowing.
9. "One man bank." This means a bank whose directors are mere
"dummies" or "rubber stamps." "It is the duty of directors to know
what is going on in a bank."
Failures Due to Too Small Banks and Too Many
It is common opinion that banks fail largely because they are small
and their resources are inadequate. Of banks capitalized for $15,000
or under, 21.2 per cent failed during the period; of those capitalized
for $35,000 and over, 21.9 per cent; and of those between $15,000 and
$35,000, 21.7 per cent (Table XLII). There is no evidence that small
capitalization is a cause of failure. The reason that more banks of
the lesser capital stock fail is that there are more of them. • The losses
sustained by the failure of a large bank are usually several times those
sustained by the failure of a small bank. Probably, however, people
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are more disturbed over the failure of ten banks of $10,000 capital each
than by the failure of one bank of $100,000 capital. Capital stock is
not a good measure of the size of a bank's business. But the fact that
346 banks out of 432 with capital stock of $12,000 or less safely
weathered the storm of depression between 1920 and 1926, suggests
that a small bank can be as safely managed as a large one.
TABLE XLII
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF MINNESOTA BANKS CLOSED ON BASIS OF CAPITAL STOCKS FOR
PERIOD 1920 TO END OF 1926*
Capital stockt Banks Closed $ Closed
per cent
$10,000 401 8o 20.0
12,000 31 6 19.4
15,000  153 38 24.8
20,000 102 16 15.7
25,000 
 234 57 24.4
30,000 56 )
l 12 21.0
32,000 
I 535,000 6 I 16.7
40,000 19 2 10 5
50,000 79 17 21.5
6o,000 8 3 37.5
75,000 7 2 42.9
100,000 23 2 8.7
* Savings banks and trust companies not included.
t As of June zo, /920.
$ Capital Trust Bank of St. Paul not included.
The total number of national and state banks, including trust com-
panies and savings banks, per $1,000,000 deposit, for each county in
1920, with the percentage of closures in each county for the years 1920
to 1925, inclusive, is shown in Figure 15. In general, the more banks
per $1,000,000 deposits, the larger the percentage of failures. The
relationship is by no means close and there are many outstanding ex-
ceptions.24 Too many banks is probably the largest single cause of
bank failures. The argument against small banks is not so Much on
the score of their being small as that small banks may mean too many
banks, too high unit costs of operation, too much competition for loans,
and a general weakening of the whole banking system.
Failures Due to Agricultural Loans
There can be no doubt that the depression in agriculture following
1920 is the first cause of the epidemic of bank failures. If evidence is
needed, it is given in the two maps in Figure 16, the upper show-
ing the prOportion of bank loans to agriculture, and the lower, the
24 The simple coefficient of correlation was 0.35 out of a possible Loo.
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_ NUMBER OF BANKS PER MILLION DOLLARS OF DEPOSITS AND
PERCENTAGE OF BANKS FAILING BETWEEN
1920 AND DECEMBER 31, 1925
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Fig. 15. In general, the more banks per million dollars deposits the larger the
percentage of failures.
number of bank failures. Failures are most numerous where agricul-
tural loans are high. Failures in Minnesota have been most numerous
in relation to the population away from city centers, even after allow-
ance is made for difference in size of banks. By types of farming,
they have been mot numerous where farming includes the most cash
crops, the Red River Valley having suffered most and the dairy region
least (Fig. 17).
The fundamental reason why more banks fail in the farming centers
than in the industrial centers when a general depression strikes the
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BANK LOANS FOR AGRICULTURE COMPARED WITH
BANK LOANS FOR OTHER PURPOSES
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Fig. 16. Maps from U.S. Dept. Agr. Separate No. 1915. Farm Credit, by Nils A. Olson.
Upper.-A department survey shows that bank loans for agricultural purposes in
1923 amounted to about 14 per cent of the total loans and discounts of all state and
national banks. Farm mortgage loans amounted to 4.5 per cent and personal and col-
lateral loans to 9.5 per cent of bank loans to farmers.
Lower.-Bank failures between June 30, 1920, and June 30, 1924, totaled 1,960,
as compared with 202 during the four years 1910 to 1913. Most of these were in the
farming sections of the country. While the depression in agriculture was a large factor
in these failures, inadequate resources and inefficient banking methods were important
contributing causes.
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT IN MINNESOTA 77
country is that agriculture can not adjust itself to a lower price level
as quickly as can industry. When an industrial plant can not sell its
products at a price sufficient to cover cost of operation, it is closed.
This reduces production and keeps the price of the product from fall-
ing so far as it otherwise might. Part of the loss of shutting down is
shared by the unemployed laborers. When the closed plant ceases to
buy raw materials, the prices of raw materials decline rapidly and the
producers on the farm and elsewhere find themselves sharing some of
the loss. As the supply of manufactured goods declines and the price
offered for them approaches the former level; the plants are opened
again and laborers are hired at a wage much nearer the former wage
level than would likely have been possible had the plant continued in
operation.
LOCATION OF STATE BANK FAILURES, 1920 TO 1926, INCLUSIVE
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Fig. 17. Failures have been most numerous in relation to population away from
the city counties even after allowance is made for the difference in size of banks.
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The farmer, on the other hand, can not close down. He can not
stop milking the cows, cultivating the corn, or cutting his grain and
come back a few months later and start the farm factory going again.
When prices broke in 1920, the farmers' crops were already planted
with costly seed and labor and could not be harvested until months
later. Moreover, farming is to a large extent a family business with
three-quarters of the man labor performed by the owner and his family.
If the farmer leaves the farm, he loses a home as well as a job. With
a fall in prices, the hired help may be dismissed, but taxes and interest
must be paid when due and the family must live. When prices decline
sharply, the farmer often feels that more must be produced to meet
the fixed annual expenses. Repairs are delayed, improvements are
postponed, but men, women, and children work harder and longer in
order to produce more at lower prices to maintain the necessary income.
Also, ownership of a farm is an individual matter and the risks of
ownership are not scattered, as is usually the case with a corporation.
It takes the major part of a man's lifetime to become a complete farm
owner; hence most farmers are in debt. Much of the capital invested
in farming is more or less fixed. A dairy cow does not reach her
prime for five or six years and does well to pay for herself when eight
years old. Tile drains and buildings require many years to pay for
themselves. The cost of removing stumps and stones must be spread
over many years. Because of this, the rate of turnover in agriculture
is very slow compared with that in industry, hence agriculture adjusts
itself much more slowly to deflation.
The effects of the foregoing are most clearly seen in a comparison
of prices of farm products and other products from 1914 to 1926 with
those of 1913,•as in Figure 18. Beginning in June, 1920, all prices fell
rapidly. But the wholesale price index for all commodities fell only
from 231 to 170, while the index of farm prices fell as follows:
Date Farm price level, per cent of 1913'5
January, 1920 
 247
June, 1920 
 237
January, 1921 
 143
June, 1921 
 114
In May, 1920, the price of wheat was $3.00 a bushel. By the follow-
ing December the price had declined to $1.68. In June, 1920, corn was
selling at $2.00 and in December at 76 cents. As agriculture was un-
able to curtail its production to suit the new economic conditions, its
products continued to fall in price while factory products soon began
to recover. This reduced the purchasing power of farm products, as
shown in the lower curve in Figure 18.
23 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 367, p. 18.
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However, the reason that so much of the agricultural bank paper
of the period of depression is not liquid is not that price levels ate so
far out of line now as that the things the farmer sells are now so much
cheaper than during the war and the two post-war years when he con-
tracted his debts. On the basis of war incomes, many farmers bought
machinery, buildings, land, automobiles, and better livestock on credit
at high prices.. It is difficult to pay interest and principal with farm
commodities from 25 to so per cent below the level at which the debts
were incurred. Farmers who did not go into debt at war prices have
continued to progress financially. The farmer may greatly curtail his
buying by getting along without many things he would like to have,
but he can not avoid paying for the goods he bought at a war time
price level of 200 to 270.
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Fig. 18. Relationship of Wholesale Prices of Agricultural and Non-agricultural Products
and Their Ratio from 1914 to 1926. Base Year, 1910-14
The great increase in taxes and railroad rates after 1920 added still
further to the farmers' disadvantage. Taxes in -Minnesota for 1921-22
were 246 per cent of what they were in 1913-14 ;26 the average freight
rates on 50 representative agricultural products in the United States
were 159.8 per cent of the 1913 rate.27 The rate on wheat from Tracy
to New Ulm, Minnesota, on January I, 1913, averaged 121.7 per cent
of the 1913 rate. The rate on oats from McIntosh to Minneapolis, in
1923, was 144.2 per cent of the 1913 leve1.28
Failures Due to Bad Management
If banks are to be kept from failing in periods of depressed prices,
they must be reasonably well managed. Neither poor management nor
depression alone ordinarily will cause bank failure, but a combination of
20 U.S. Dept. Agr. Yearbook, 1922, p. 1002. •
27 U.S. Dept. Agr. Yearbook, 1922, p. iou.
28 U.S. Dept. Agr. Yearbook, 1922, p. 1014.
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the two. A poorly managed bank will get along till a crisis comes and
will then be wiped out.
The bankers did their worst banking just at a time when their best
was needed. Their experience had been such as to unfit them for
handling the problems of 1919 and 1920. During the preceding 23
years of rising price levels for farm products, farm incomes had grad-
ually increased. Rising incomes had resulted in an increased capitaliz:-
tion of farms. The result was that loans to farmers had generally
been good. Country bankers had found by experience that the farmers'
business was sound, and they competed for it actively. Excessive loans
on real estate were usually well secured by the time the loan matured,
because of rising land values. The increased demand for food following
the opening of the World War, in August, 1914, caused prices of farm
products to rise sharply. Bank deposits increased rapidly (Fig. 19).
Farmers soon paid their current obligations to the banks and to the
CHANGES IN SAVINGS ACCOUNTS, TIME CERTIFICATES, AND
CHECKING ACCOUNTS FOR MINNESOTA STATE BANKS
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Fig. 19. Checking accounts increased 156 per cent, savings deposits 592 per cent,
and time deposits 95 per cent from June 23, 1915, to February 28, 1920. Checking ac-
counts declined about 36 per cent in 1920. Savings accounts have continued considerably
above the 1919 level while checking accounts at the end of 1925 were roughly on the
1918 level.
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business men. Prosperity became rampant and business conditions
changed. The rapidly growing deposits neutralized the seasonal fluctua-
tions in demands for money and many bankers became more careless
in extending credit. It was well known that many loans made would
need to be renewed at maturity. Banks that had been persistent bor-
rowers paid off their debts with the large supply of loanable funds that
came to them. The new prosperity filled both bankers and their cus-
tomers with a spirit of optimism. Bankers began to encourage borrow-
ing by farmers and business men in order to employ their loanable
funds. Because of profits from increased value of inventory between
purchase and sale, customers responded readily to the easy credit op-
portunity. When the war ended, expansion halted for a time, as de-
pression was generally expected. Soon, however, prices began rising
again because of heavy purchases by Europe on money borrowed in
the United States and the $25 per capita contributed in the United
States to the Red Cross.
The banks further expanded their loans. People who had been
saving during the war cashed their liberty bonds freely in order to
spend the proceeds. Conservatism gave way to extravagance and specu-
lation. Old standards of credit analysis and principles of lending were
forgotten, and as the "economic spree" continued, loans were made with
almost unbelievable liberality.
In order to obtain high interest rates and liberal discounts collect-
able on customers' notes, banks began to borrow larger and larger
amounts as the period of expansion continued. Borrowings increased
during the war period, especially in the period after the United States
entered the war, but they increased more rapidly in 1919 and 1920 while
the land boom was rampant (Table XLIII). Few bankers were con-
cerned with the fact that the rapid inflation of values was largely
caused by the great expansion of bank credit in the banking system,
and the failure of the Federal Reserve Bank to raise the discount rate
so that the government might float the Victory loan at a low rate of
interest.
Finally, as the expenses of business overtook business profits, the
expanding price level and the shrinking value of the dollar came to
an abrupt end in June, 1920. Banks soon found that owing to falling
incomes, farmers were unable to reduce the amount of their short-time
current loans. At first it was generally expected that prices would
soon recover, and the banks had to renew loans and did so rather will-
ingly. This necessitated more borrowed money to maintain the reserves,
which were declining rapidly owing to declining deposits. Bills payable
and notes rediscounted for state banks increased over II million dollars
after June, 1920, and did not reach their height until late in 1921 (Table
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XLIII). The increase in borrowed money after June, 1920, was about
seven times the total amount borrowed in 1915.
TABLE XLIII •
MONEY BORROWED BY MINNESOTA STATE BANKS AT VARIOUS DATES BETWEEN
1910 AND 1927*
Date Thousands
June 30, 1910 $ 486
June 7, 1911 1,177
June 14, 1912 790
August 9, 1913 1,110
June 30, 1914 1,208
June 23, 1915 1,713
June 30, 1916 2,006
July 25, 1917 3,489
June 29, 1918 6,977
June 30, 1919 4,199
December 31, 1919 8,117
June 30, 1920 17,044
October 6, 1920 24,177
November 15, 1920 27,461
February 21, 1921 28,241
June 30, 1921 28,194
October 6, 1921 28,504
December 31, 1921 27,815
June 30, 1922 
 
20,658
June 30, 1923 13,608
June 30, 1924 9,897
June 30, 1925 4,586
December 31, 1925 3,975
March 15, 1926 • 3,338
June 30, 1926 4,337
November 13, 1926 4,390
December 31, 1926 4,072
December 31, 1927 2,839
* From Abstracts of the State Banking Department.
In attempting to maintain their reserves against declining deposits
and slow liquidation, the banks raised the rate of interest on time
deposits. Probably this was a mistaken policy, as it appears to have
resulted only in withdrawal of small funds from banks that did not
raise their rate of interest and their deposit in those that did. Bank
expenses were increased when they should have been lowered. It is
questionable whether a higher rate of interest induces an immediate
increase in savings.
Too frequently credits to farmers and merchants were so excessive
that the face of the loan was greater than the value of the security or
any security that the debtors could offer on the basis of the new price
level. The volume of losses from such loans need not be very large
to cause a small bank to fail. Too many banks of all sizes had paid
20 per cent dividends in 1919 and 1920 instead of creating a large re-
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serve for losses. Where the farmer could supply ample land security,
hundreds of banks were saved by the farmer funding his current in-
debtedness into a long-time real estate loan. The Minnesota Rural
Credit Bureau probably saved scores of banks by accepting several
hundred marginal land loans during 1924. Loans made by the Minne-
sota Credit Bureau also gave the farmer an opportunity to save his
farm and home by spreading the payment of his debt over several years
with a low rate of interest.
COMMERCIAL STATE AND NATIONAL BANKS IN MINNESOTA
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Fig. 20. Through consolidation and failures the number of state commercial banks
and national banks in Minnesota at the end of 1927 has been reduced to the level cf 1915.
The period of adjustment to the new price level was marked by
political unrest, bankruptcy, bank failures, and reversion of land to
former owners. The public knows little of the hundreds of owners
of bank stock that have been compelled to pay assessments to put their
banks on a solvent footing. Through consolidations and failures the
number of banks in 1927 was reduced to that of 1915, as shown in
Figure 20 and Table XXXIX. As a whole, the banks of Minnesota
are now thought to be in better financial condition than at any time
since 1920. Most banks are independent of outside capital.
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"Frozen Assets"
Probably the term "frozen assets" has been too freely used as an
explanation of bank failures. It is true that banks found themselves
in too many instances with slow notes of farmers and merchants in
their files. However, if there had been ample security behind these
slow notes, they could have been rediscounted or the security sold and
thus liquidated. It is doubtful if a well-secured note, even in the
depths of depression, could not have found a market. But the so-called
"frozen" notes found in the bank files were often entirely unsecured,
often signed by individuals or corporations whose financial rating never
warranted a credit extension as large as the face of the notes, and in
many cases the secured notes were secured by property that had come
to be worth less than the face of the note. Thus in many cases• the
notes were worthless or nearly so. That many of the "frozen credits"
were worth less than their par value is shown by the fact that many
banks failed long after credit became plentiful. As has been said on
several occasions, the "frozen assets" have often proved to be "rotten"
when they started to "thaw."
Banking Regulation as a Means of Improvement
In general, there are three lines of attack on the problem of im-
proving country banking. One is to set up more overhead institutions
to work with the banks and co-ordinate their activities. It seems that
with the three types of federal banking institutions we can rest for a
while and learn to make proper use of what we have. Another is to
adopt research and educational programs for the purpose of improving
local management. The possibilities of this have been barely scratched.
The third is to develop a higher order of regulation of these activities.
The third method everyone turns to first. And surely banking is a
type of business that must submit to a large measure of public super-
vision and control.
In Minnesota, public interests have been safeguarded by an efficient
Department of Banking; but the powers of the department have been
limited in. some important respects. The general philosophy has been
the same as in other central western states, namely, that the public
would be best served if individuals were allowed to engage freely in
the banking business with as little supervision and control as possible.
Under this system, many small independent banks have developed, the
capital .of which has been largely contributed by the community in
which the bank is located. The officers and directors of each bank
usually are local men interested in using the funds of the bank to
develop local industries. Prior to 1920, charters were granted with-
out much restraint. People in Minnesota have generally objected to
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control of local banks by outside capital. Branch banking never made
any substantial progress and was prohibited by law in 1923. (Chapter
170, Session Laws 1923.) The capital requirements established by law
have been so low that a bank could be established at every hamlet or
country trading center.
Prior to 1919 the number of banks that might be established at one
point to compete for business was unlimited, with the result that the
number of small banks increased rapidly. It is not unusual to find two
or more banks in small towns where there should be only one. The
cost of credit has been needlessly high—the entire banking buisness of
most communities could have been easily performed with one overhead
charge instead of two or more. Surely two banks of $5o,000 capital
each could be run more cheaply and serve the community better than
four banks of $25,000 capital each.
The advice given by. Kelsey S. Chase, superintendent of banks in
1912, is to the point. He says, "There have been thirty-five banks
chartered during the past six months, almost all of which were or-
ganized with a capital of $1o,000. The prosperity of Minnesota and
of any community within the state is not enhanced by a large number
of banks, but its prosperity does depend in part upon the strength of
its existing banks. Almost any three or five individuals can organize
and operate a bank for a time, and no one can lawfully prevent them,
even tho the incorporators might be absolutely incompetent and finan-
cially irresponsible. Often the seed which later develops into a second
bank in a community where only one bank is needed is sown through
local jealousies and factional quarrels. Irresponsible parties who have
been denied loans by the existing bank are often the most aggressive
agitators for a second bank."29
Prior to 1910, banks and other financial institutions in Minnesota
were under the jurisdiction of the public examiner. Private banks were
not under state supervision until 1907. The laws of 1907 compelled
private banking institutions to incorporate as banks or discontinue
business, so there were no private banks in operation by November 1,
1909." The establishment of the Department of Banking, in 1909, to
enforce all banking laws was a decided step forward. While the legis-
lature has always been friendly to the requests of the banking depart-
ment for increased funds, the work required of the department has
grown so rapidly that appropriations have not been sufficient to meet
the increased demands. Salary limitations have greatly hampered the
department. After a man is well trained to do bank examination work,
he ordinarily has little difficulty in securing a $5,000 position with a
29 Third annual report, Dept. of Banking, p. XXIX.
3° Report, Dept. of Banking, 1910, p. IV..
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private enterprise. This is more than the upper -limit established by
law to be paid to the superintendent of banks.
The work of the superintendent of banks31 under the law is to exer-
cise a constant supervision over the books and affairs of all state banks
and other financial corporations and, through the examiners provided
for, visit all state banks at least twice each year and investigate the
character and value of their assets. He is required further to investi-
gate the method of operation and conduct of such corporations and
their system of, accounting, and to ascertain whether such methods and
systems are in accordance with the law and with sound banking prin-
ciples. He may examine, or cause to be examined, on oath, any officer,
agent, customer, or depositor of any bank on matters touching the
business thereof, and compel access to such books, accounts, documents,
and property as he may desire to inspect. No examiner may examine
any bank in which he is interested directly or indirectly.
Changes in Banking Laws
During the last few years, marked progress has been made in
remedying elements of weakness in the law relating to bank regulation
and administration. The following are the more outstanding changes
made. The Minnesota State Bankers Association has almost without
exception taken the lead in securing these reforms.
T. Perhaps the most important change has been that of granting to
the State Securities Commission control over the granting of the initial
charter for any kind of bank to be organized under the laws of the
state. (Chapter 86, Session Laws, 1919.) Heretofore, weak, un-
necessary, and poorly managed state banks have been organized by
itinerant promotors who were interested only in collecting a liberal
f ee.32 The law of 1919 enables the commission to deny a new charter
where the need for additional banking facilities does not appear to
exist, or where added competition would endanger the solvency of
existing banks, or if the commission is not satisfied that the proposed
bank will be safely managed. The practical working of this law is
shown by the fact that 20 out of 42 applications for charters from
July I, 1923, to June 30, 1924, were denied.
2. Closely connected with the power granted the State Securities
Commission to prevent, under certain conditions, an increase of state
banks, is the permission given to existing banks to consolidate. With
the written consent of the superintendent of banks, one bank may con-
solidate with another, but the transfer of assets and liabilities to anothel-
bank shall be without prejudice to the creditors of either. (General
" Changed to commissioner of banks in 1925.
22 Third annual report, Dept. of Banking, p. 7.
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Statutes, 1913, 6373.) The consolidation of two banks may make one
strong bank in place of two weak ones. The department has been en-
couraging such procedure. A. J. Veigel, superintendent of banks, says
"Many cities and especially villages have too many banks. If a bank
does not have enough business to pay reasonable salaries, dividends,
charge off losses, and build up a surplus, it will probably not be a safe
bank indefinitely. Our department is therf ore encouraging and even
urging certain banks to consolidate when the conditions warrant such
action."33
3. The reorganization bill of 1925 changed the term of office of
the superintendent of banks from two to six years. The effect of this
change is to make the office less subject to political disturbances and
influence. The activities of the Department of Banking in protecting
the public interest must necessarily often interfere with the private
activities of individuals having more or less political influence; hence
the more nearly management can be divorced from political influence,
the more efficient the management may become.
4. An important safeguard incorporated in the laws of 1925 deals
with restrictions on loans to officers and directors. "No cashier or
other officer or employee of a bank shall sell to such bank, directly or
indirectly, any mortgage, bond, note, stock or other security whatso-
ever without the written approval of the board of directors filed in the
office of the bank—and a copy sent to the State Superintendent of
Banks." (Chapter 305, Session Laws 1925.)
"Every state bank shall be protected by good and sufficient sureties
against unlawful acts of any of its officers or employees. The bonds
must be satisfactory to the Superintendent of Banks." (Chapter 351,
Session Laws 1925). This provision is an important recent safeguard
adopted by law. Probably the law did not go far enough in this respect.
A perusal Of the annual reports of the banking department over a num-
ber of years conveys the impression that the banking department fre-
quently felt that too many banks were managed like a private land
company. The Royalton and Bowlus cases, described in the 1912 report
of the banking department, show the extreme to which a bank may be
looted by over-loaning to officers and companies in which the officers
are interested. The day has passed when any banker may regard a
bank as a private institution in the same sense as a real estate office.
5. The state banking department has for many years recommended
to the legislature an increase in the minimum capital of banks, but the
matter was not acted upon favorably until 1927. The 1927 legislature
amended the former law regulating capital and surplus requirements
as follows:
33 Letter to all state banks and trust companies, dated September 22, 1924.
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Old law New law
• Population Minimum Population
of of
municipality Capital Surplus municipality
Minimum
Capital Surplus
500 •or less*  $io,000 $ 2,000
i,000 or less $3o,000 $2,000 500 to 1,000 20,000 4,000
1,000 to 1,500 15,000 3,000 1,000 to 2,500 25,000 5,000
1,500 to 2,000 20,000 4,000 2,500 to I00,000 40,000 8,000
2,000 or more 25,000 5,000 ioo,000 and over 5o,000 10,000
* Left to discretion of securities commission, where there is no bank.
Under both the old law and the -1927 law there must be a paid-in
surplus equal to not less than one-fifth of the capital stock. The new
requirements apply only to banks hereafter organized, so if the present
banks, as seems likely, constitute the bulk of the banks for a consider-
able period, the gains to depositors through a greater margin of safety
are deferred to the future. A qualification should be noted—the 1927
legislature amended the banking laws so that no state bank or trust
company shall accept deposits in a sum exceeding 25 times the amount
of its capital and surplus. The increased capital requirements should
tend to reduce the demand for new banks. Wyoming, Idaho, and
Utah recently increased the required minimum initial capitalization of
new banks to $25,000. In fact, the minimum is now $25,000 in most
states.34 Minnesota's minimum requirement appears to be rather.
conservative.
With the advent of improved roads and the general use of motor
vehicles, there is less need for a small bank at every cross-road. No
doubt people would be willing to travel a little farther for banking
services if it would bring greater security for their deposits and help
to insure a continuous loaning service instead of the recent disreputable
situation, as a result of which in some communities there is practically
no adequate banking service. Banks with larger capital and surplus
would also have an advantage in being able to take care of the needs
of the larger borrowers in the community, as the state law limits the
size of loan to any one individual or corporation to 15 per cent of the
capital and surplus of the bank. The considerable decrease in the value
of a dollar from 1913 to 1926 makes the nominal increase in capital and
surplus larger than the real increase in terms of purchasing power.
Further Changes Proposed
It is believed that the following further changes would assist still
more in preventing epidemics of bank failures such as the recent one.
1. The appropriations for carrying on the work of the banking
department ought to be increased and the salaries for the super-
84 Frank W. Simonds, Deputy Manager, A. B. A., American Bankers Association Journal,
p. 327. November, 3925.
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intendent and experienced examiners should be increased sufficiently
to enable the department to compete successfully with private .busi-
ness for trained and experienced men. Chapter 136, General Laws
1919, provides that certain fees are to be charged for the examination
of state banks, savings banks, trust companies, and building and loan
associations, such fees to be paid into the state treasury and credited to
the general revenue fund of the state. The fees earned by the depart-
ment under this law during the fiscal years 1923 and 1924 amounted
to $156,8o5.35 The total expenses of the department for the two years
were $269,657. Deducting the fees earned, the amount paid by the
state for the two years is $112,852—an average of $56,426 a year. The
small additional appropriation required to obtain and retain a com-
petent personnel would be good economy for the people of the state.36
2. Another change in the law thought to be desirable is to reduce
the number of mandatory examinations from two to one, because more
time would be available for optional examinations where these are most
needed. Many banks are run so conservatively that more than one
examination a year seems to be useless.
3. Some plan should be evolved for giving the banking department
control over the qualifications of local bank officers. At present no
such control exists after a bank is once established. The basis of such
control might be a licensing system by means of which minimum
standards could be set up and enforced, such as are enforced for drug-
gists. Through a licensing system the managers of banks might be
required to have a knowledge of banking laws, to know something
about price levels and business cycles, banking and investment prin-
ciples, and to have had a reasonable amount of banking experience.
4. Greater protection should be provided savings depositors in com-
mercial banks. It is proposed that the assets in which savings deposits
are invested should be segregated and that it be unlawful to pledge any
such assets as security for borrowed money. It is believed that savings
depositors, more than checking depositors, suffer deprivation from bank
losses. Furthermore, a bank usually borrows in order to make loans
to customers having checking account. A checking account usually
represents but a small part of the assets of any individual, and a partial
loss of such accounts seldom results in actual personal deprivation.
It seems appropriate to segregate the investments made with time de-
posit funds, and to make such securities not subject for any liability
of the bank other than that to its time depositors.
5. County clearing-house associations should be established. The
clearing-house idea is a part of the program of the clearing-house sec-
35 Department of Banking, Thirteenth Ann. Rept., p. io.
" The 1927 legislature allowed an increase of $8,500 to the banking departmei t.
,••
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tion of the American Bankers' Association, by whom it has been ad-
vocated for several years.37 The clearing-house movement began in
Chicago about 1905, after the Walsh bank failures, and has since
spread to 32 cities and to a few country communities. The plan con-
sists simply of a voluntary examination by an examiner employed by
the association, who concentrates his attention on a few banks and
whose reports serve as the basis of a credit bureau for improving
banking conditions in the territory of the association. In organizing
such an association, the banks of one county or of several counties
combine for mutual protection, and agree upon certain banking stand-
ards. These standards should soon become the basis of increased public
confidence.
A managing committee is selected and an examiner employed. The
duties of the examiner are to make periodic thoro examinations of each
bank in the association. All assets of the bank are examined, all notes
and other assets and securities are carefully checked, and intra-bank
borrowings detected. After such examination, the actual position of
each bank is determinable. A complete report is made, which would
furnish a basis of appraisal of the bank's ability to pay its depositors.
The report should be frank and open and presented in person to the
directors of each bank. Under the clearing-house system, no excuse
exists for serious losses, and the public would be protected to the fullest
extent.
Unless bankers can be held responsible for the banks that fail, there
is no valid argument against the justice of government guaranty of
bank deposits. When the federal government, the state, or a county
deposits money in a bank, it usually requires a bond from the bank
guaranteeing the safety of the deposit. The individual has as much
right to be insured as has the government. State guaranty laws have
generally been unsuccessful because insurance was attempted without
respect to the risk and also because of political control. There are in-
surance companies that will insure bank deposits but not without select-
ing the risks to be insured.
The depositors have a right to some basis of discrimination between
banks. Under the clearing-house system, the banks themselves provide
such a system. Banks not managed according to the principles adopted
by the association are expelled or forced to conform. Knowing the
risks, the association ought to be in a position to see that no depositor
ever loses a dollar.
There are two main objections to the plan. Some say that the
jealousy and distrust among neighboring bankers makes it impossible
37 The Way to Sounder Banking, by C. B. Hazelwood, American Bankers Association
Journal, p. 256. October, 3925.
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to get bankers to co-operate in this way. This objection was raised
when the system was first proposed for city bankers. Some of the city
bankers were slow to join, but all managers of large city banks are
now thoroly convinced that the plan has materially advanced their
welfare. The bankers' opposition can not be well founded, because
any plan to strengthen the banking system benefits the largest as well
as the smallest bank.
It may also be objected that as banks operate on a narrow margin,
few could afford to join a country clearing-house association. If we
assume an association with 25 member banks with each bank contribut-
ing $250 annually, a fund of $6,250 would be provided—an amount
sufficient to hire a good manager and a stenographer. It is doubtful
if $250 could be used in any other way to purchase as much protection,
confidence, and good will. It is claimed that membership in a city clear-
ing house has increased deposits, and it should increase deposits in
country banks even more. The probable benefits of the clearing-house
organization seem to more than justify the expense.
The country clearing-house plan, then, ought to reduce risks and
losses, increase profits in banking, and at the same time help to meet
the rather insistent demands of those interested in the integration of
banks through branch banking. It has possibilities of being an effective
and sensible solution of the present demand for guaranty of individual
bank deposits.
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
NUMBER AND AMOUNT OF MORTGAGE LOANS, FORECLOSED LOANS, AND DELINQUENT INSTALL-
MENTS HELD BY MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF RURAL CREDIT,
DECEMBER 31, 1926
County
Mortgage loans
-Delinquent installments Fortc.osed 13ans
Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount
Aitkin 325 $ 758,600 46 $ 6,451 4 8 8.538
Anoka 88 311,900 9 2,025 none
Becker 312 1,631,100 6o 18,897 II 80,516
Beltrami 243 493,700 45 6,492 6 19,605
Benton 21 95,900 I 194 none
Big Stone 31 234,100 9 3,797 none
Blue Earth 30 275,100 I 200 none
Brown 32 322,500 none none
Carlton 156 306,300 13 1,309 3 5,126
Carver 17 142,700 3 569 none
Cass 334 736,600 53 5,710 17 52,466
Chippewa 46 412,200 I 406 2 18,68o
Chisago 110 540,000 6 775 2 15,425
Clay 162 1,116,000 21 7,664 4 25.499
Clearwater 307 1,055,100 50 9,889 6 29,592
Cook none 5 1,462 none
Cottonwood 39 420,000 none none
Crow Wing 130 373,900 s 1,758 none
Dakota 74 356,100 24 4,682 4 12,152
Dodge 25 215,100 none none
Douglas 79 521 Soo 12 4,580 none
Faribault 36 408,200 7 2,440 none
Fillmore 17 158,500 2 1,164 none
Freeborn 30 282,700 2 559 none
Goodhue 7 43,800 none none
Grant 82 630,700 4 985 none
Hennepin 61 244,100 5 2,341 none
Houston II 88,700 I 252 1 7,714
Hubbard 133 367,800 15 2,241 1 4,721
Isanti 162 634,900 9 1,327 I 2,863
Itasca 98 218,700 10 802 none
Jackson 30 338,900 5 1,741 none
Kanabec 204 779,600 22 3,244 I 5,518
Kandiyohi 50 345,300 3 1,489 I 9,084
Kittson 338 1,785,500 70 22,322 18 97,395
Koochiching 45 77,800 3 220 none
Lac qui Parle 56 555,100 3 1,938 none
Lake 3 6,200 none none
Lake of the Woods 152 229,800 28 2,881 none
LeSueur 17 120,500 none none
Lincoln 77 771,800 8 3,079 none
Lyon 56 6o8,600 4 932 none
McLeod s 75,500 none none
Mahnomen 170 844,700 41 14,829 5 50,885
Marshall 6o5 2,710.700 114 37,154 34 223,877
Martin 23 242,300 I 375 none
Meeker 34 259,100 none none
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TABLE I-Continued
NUMBER AND AMOUNT OF MORTGAGE LOANS, FORECLOSED LOANS, AND DELINQUENT INSTALL-
MENTS HELD BY MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF RURAL CREDIT,
DECEMBER 31, 1926
Mortgage loans Delinquent installments
County
Number
Mille Lacs 93
Morrison 141
Mower 5
Murray 28
Nicollet 28
Nobles 6
Norman 140
Olmsted - 4
Ottertail 375
Pennington 317
Pine 280
Pipestone 6
Polk 490
Pope 63
Ramsey 29
Red Lake 210
Redwood 23
Renville 75
Rice 6
Rock 3
Roseau 536
St. Louis 65
Scott 36
Sherburne 93
Sibley 10
Stearns 66
Steele 7
Stevens 45
Swift 102
Todd 161
Traverse 45
Wabasha 21
Wadena 179
Waseca II
Washington 77
Watonwan 14
Wilkin 38
Winona 24
Wright 30
Yellow Medicine 25
Amount Number Amount
Foreclosed loans
Number Amount
338,600 5 1,100 I 3,259
650,500 10 2,679 2 25,226
53,500 none none
305,200 7 3,803 none
175,700 none none
49,600 none none
842,100 27 6,507 4 48,992
32,700 none none
2,065,400 26 6,158 I 4,929
1,498,000 82 21,514 28 171,859
813,800 20 3,522 2 18,281
53,500 1 936 none
2,949,000 63 20,476 13 141,132
481,100 II 5,093 none
107,400 4 459 none
88o,800 24 8,854 7 35,205
237.500 3 1,547 ' none
694,100 7 3,209 none
48,900 none none
29,000 none none
1,521,400 87 13,356 12 45,444
132,000 8 751 none
287,000 6 1,707 none
343,600 6 2,050 none
111,500 I 287 none
460,800 7 1,899 I 4,833
76,000 none none
382,200 I 188 none
907,000 20 6,727 I 7,555
839,400 10 2,398 none
355,300 5 3,173 I 10,336
172,100 5 1,097 none
747,300 34 5,744 2 7,845
84,700 none none
449,700 15 5,161 none
128,100 mi'ne none -
325,700 2 432 I 7,560
222,300 I 2 2 18,454
187,100 3 , 1,000 none
260,500 I 619 none
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TABLE II
DIRECT LOANS OF THE TWELVE FEDERAL INTERMEDIATE CREDIT BANKS TO CO-OPERATIVE
MARKETING ASSOCIATIONS, CLOSE OF BUSINESS DECEMBER 31, 1927
District
Tobacco,
Beans (a)
Red-top seed (b)
'Wheat,
Dried fruit (c)
Cotton,
Alfalfa seed (d)
Raisins (e)
Wool
Springfield $ 50,000
Baltimore 2,298;198
Columbia $2,665,000
Louisville 1,950,409
New Orleans 4,880,721
St. Louis 51,600(b) 658,210
St. Paul $ 826,682 1,166
Omaha 550,000 209,970
Wichita 1,160,000 5,240,000 43,745
Houston 1,500,000
Berkeley 250,000(a) 407,705(c) 5,950,000(e) 21,055
Spokane 6o,000 (a) 37,400(c) 54,000 (d) 135,506
District
Canned fruits
and vegetables
Rice,
Honey (f)
Total
direct loans
Springfield
Baltimore 
Columbia 
Louisville 
New Orleans 
$ 50,000
2,298,198
2,665,000
1,950,409
4,880,721
St. Louis $ 659,238 1,369,048
St. Paul 20,000 847,848
Omaha 759,970
Wichita 6,443,745
Houston 1,500,000
Berkeley 611,241 1,155,646 8,395,647
Spokane 511,149 31,945(f) 830,009
TABLE III
PERCENTAGE OF TENANCY IN MINNESOTA AND NEIGHBORING STATES COMPARED, 1890-1925
Percentage of farms rented
Area
1925 1920 1910 1900 1890
Minnesota 27.1 24.7 21.0 17.3 12.9
North Dakota 34.4 25.6 • 14.3 8.5 6.9
South Dakota 41.5 34.9 24.8 ' 21.8 13.2
Montana 21.4 11.3 8.9 9.2 4.8
Iowa 44.7 41.7 37.8 34.9 28.1
Wisconsin 15.5 14.4 13.9 13.5 11.4
Illinois 42.0 42.7 41.4 39.3 34.0
East north central states 26.0 28.1 27.0 26.3 22.8
West north central states 37.8 34.2 30.9 29.6 24.0
United States 38.6 38.1 37.0 35.0 28.4
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TABLE IV
AMORTIZATION PLAN USED BY FEDERAL LAND BANK
Principal $1000 Rate 5% Semi-Annual Installments $30.00 Final Installment $46.58
Amortization table
Year due No. Interest* Principal* Date paid Initial Balan
ce
1920 I $25.00
$995.00$ 5.00
•
1920 2 24.88
5.12 989.88
1921 3 24.75
984.635.25 -----
1921 4 24.62 979.255.38
-1922 5 24.48 973.735.52
1922 6 24.34
968.075.66
1923 7 24.20
962.275.80
1923 8 24.06 956.335.94
6.09
1924 9 23.91
950.24
6.241924 io 23.76
944.00
6.401925 ii 23.60
937.60
6.561925 12 23.44 931.04
6.721926 13 23.28
924.32
6.891926 14 23.11 917.43
1927 15 22.94
903.137.06
1927 16 22.76
903.13
895.71
7.24
1928 17 22.58 7.42 888.10
1928 18 22.39
7.61
1929 19 22.20 880.
307.80
1929 20 22.01
872.31
864.12
7.99 -
8.191930 21 21.81
8.40 855.721930 22 21.60
8.61 847.111931 13 21.39
8.82 838.29
1931 24 21.18
829.25
1932 25 20.96 9.04
1932 26 20.73 819.989.27
1933 27 20.50
810.489.50
1933 28 20.26 800.749.74
1934 29 20.02
790.769.98
1934 30 19.77
780.5310.23
- 1935 31 19.51 770.0410.49
1935 32 19.25 759.2910.75
1936 33 18.98 748.2711.02
1936 34 18.71 736.9811.29
1937 35 18.42
725.4011.58
1937 36 18.13 713.5311.87
1938 37 17.84 701.3712.16
1938 38 17.53
688.9012.47
1939 39 17.22
676.1212.78
1939 40 16.90
663.0213.10
194o 41 16.57 646.5913.43
5940 42 .16.24
635.83I3.6
1941 43 15.90
621.7314.10
1941 44 15.54 607.2714.46
1942 45 15.18 592.4514.82
1942 46 14.81 577.2615.19
1943 47 14.43 561.6915.57
1943 48 14.04. 545.7315.96
1944 49 13.64 529.3716.36
1944 50 13.23 512.6056.77
* The columns headed "Interest" and "Principal" show the portion of each $30 amorti-
zation installment applied on interest and principal, respectively. The amount taken for interest
becomes less with each successive payment, while the amount on the principal increases each
time. The balance column shows the debt remaining after each installment has been raid.
It is entirely extinguished with the 72nd payment (36 years).
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TABLE IV-Continued
AMORTIZATION PLAN USED BY FEDERAL LAND BANK
Principal $1000 Rate 5% Semi-Annual Installments $30.00 Final Installment $46.58
Amortization table
Year due No. Interest* Principal* Date paid Initial Balance
1945 51 12.81 17.19 495.41
1945 52 12.38 17.62 477.79
1946 53 11.94 18.06 459.73
1946 54 11.49 18.5z 441.22
1947 55 11.03 18.97 422.25
1947 56 10.56 19.44 402.81
1948 57 10.07 19.93 382.88
1948 58 9.57 20.43 362.45
1949 59 9.06 20.94 341.51
1949 6o 8.54 21.46 320.05
1950 6i 8.00 22.00 298.05
275.501950 62 7.45 22.55
1951 
 63 6.89 23.11 252.39
1951 64 6.31 23.69 228.70
1952 65 5.72 24.28 204.42
1952 66 5.11 24.89 179.53
154.021953 67 4.49 25.51
1953 68 3.85 26.15 127.87
1954 69 3.20 26.80 101.07
1954 70 2.53 27.47 73.60
1955 71 1•84 28.16 45.44
1955 72 1.14 45.44
* See footnote, p. 97.


